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Abstract
The Korean pop culture (TV dramas and K-pop music) has grown immensely popular across
the globe over the past two decades. This paper analyzes its impacts on international trade. We
compile a cross-country panel dataset of South Korea’s TV show exports to over 150 countries for
the period of 1998–2014. These variations in exposure to Korean pop cultures are used to identify
changes in consumer preferences for Korean merchandise across time, countries, and products
(at the HS 4-digit level). First, we find that more Korean TV show exports significantly increase
Korean exports of goods for women, while the effects are much smaller on men’s merchandise.
This strongly supports the demand-side preference mechanism, because supply-side factors can
hardly generate such gender bias within the same product category. Second, we find that the
TV show effect is much stronger for consumer goods than capital or intermediate goods. Third,
we show that there exist significant and positive effects even for goods that are not actively
advertised. Together, these findings provide evidence on the importance of cultural preferences
and their diffusions in economic exchanges.
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1 Introduction
“The booming South Korean presence on television and in the movies has spurred Asians
to buy up South Korean goods and to travel to South Korea, traditionally not a popular
tourist destination. The images that Asians traditionally have associated with the country
— violent student marches, the demilitarized zone, division — have given way to trendy
entertainers...”
— The New York Times, 2005 (by Norimitsu Onishi)
Are cultural preferences important in international trade flows? It is difficult to systematically
identify such effects because most cultural variables — language, ethnicity, and religion, for example
— are strongly correlated with geographical factors, as well as communication and information
costs. This paper overcomes this difficulty by using the phenomenon that the Korean pop culture
has rapidly spread to many other countries in the last two decades, and demonstrates that this
leads to increased exports of South Korea by changing foreign consumers’ preferences for Korean
products. Because the measure of cultural flows in our study varies substantially over time and
across countries, and because its effects on consumers preferences are not uniform across products,
these rich variations allow us to identify the cultural effects on trade. To our knowledge, this is
the first paper in the trade literature that demonstrates the causality in which cultural shocks of a
clear source affect international trade through the demand channel.
Over the last fifteen years, the Korean popular culture, especially soap operas (television dra-
mas) and K-pop music, has become immensely popular across the globe. This phenomenon is called
“Korean Wave” (or “Han-Ryu” in Chinese), a term that was coined by the Chinese media around
1998 and is now commonly used worldwide. For example, in 2011, the French press Le Monde and
Le Figaro reported with the headlines “Korean Wave Reaches Europe” and “Korean Wave Hits
Ze´nith.”
Although K-pop is better known in the western world, it is the Korean soap operas that initially
lead the wave in Asia and in many countries in the Middle East and South America. The Korean
wave first began in China in 1997 with the drama series What is Love All About?. The soap opera
recorded a 15% audience share, meaning that over 150 million Chinese watched it.1 Meanwhile, the
wave arrived in Japan in 2003, with another Korean drama series Winter Sonata, which recorded a
sensational audience rating of 22.5%. Koreans were pleasantly surprised by this, because previously
in Japan, Korean cultural contents had hardly received any attention despite the geographical
proximity. The popularity has since grown dramatically in both countries, and nowadays, the
Korean culture has pervaded the everyday life of the people in these countries.2
Interestingly, the Korean culture has become even more popular in farther Asian/Central Asian
1The audience ratings of Korean dramas are documented by numerous news articles and various reports by South
Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange.
2For example, another Korean drama series, Descendants of the Sun, has become extremely popular in China,
hitting more than 2.6 billion viewership within the two months starting February 2016 (the sum of 16 episodes’
viewership, reported by the Chinese online video platfrom, Iqiyi). Similarly, it is no longer surprising to see a K-pop
song ranked at the top of the most popular music charts in Japan.
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countries (Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia,
Philippines, Uzbekistan, Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). For example,
in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Mongolia, the audience ratings even exceeded 70% for Jumong
(2007), Jewel in the Palace (2007), and Temptation of Wife (2009), respectively.
The Korean wave has also reached the Americas as well as the Middle East and Europe in various
years during 2007–2012 (Peru, Iran, Hungary, Panama, Ecuador, Cuba, Paraguay, Romania, El
Salvador, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Puerto Rico, UAE, Egypt, Turkey, etc.).3 In Ecuador, for
example, the wave started in 2009 with a phenomenal 55% audience rating. More surprisingly, in
Cuba, yet another two drama series recorded more than 80% audience ratings in 2012–2013.4 As
another example, in the Middle East, Islamic Republic of Iran Braodcasting (IRIB) reports that
Jewel in the Palace was ranked as the most popular drama from March to April in 2007, with a
57% audience rating and 97% satisfaction.
The spread of the Korean wave, as suggested above, surpasses physical distance, language
barriers, ethnicity and religion differences (all of them the conventional measures of cultural affinity)
and thus offers a unique source of cultural shocks that we can exploit to study its effects on consumer
preferences and demand behaviors. In this study, we construct two unique measures of exposures
to the Korean popular culture in a destination and year. First, we compile South Korea’s TV
show exports to over 150 countries for the period of 1998–2014. This measure exhibits significant
variations across countries and over time. Second, we construct a popularity index, where countries
are classified into five levels of affinity for the Korean culture as of 2015. This is based on our
own reading of various reports prepared by the Korean government agencies on the Korean wave
situation in each country. For example, one of the criteria for a country to be classified as Level
5 (where the Korean culture is very popular) is: ‘The Korean dramas and K-pop have become so
popular that the local government publicly expresses concerns and tries to restrict the inflow of
the Korean cultural contents.’ We find that the countries assigned with a Level-5 index constitute
more than 30% of the world population.
To identify the effects of the Korean wave on foreign consumer preferences, we adopt two
strategies. First, we use industry-specific trends in Korean exports to control for any industry-
specific supply shocks (at the HS 4-digit level). This reduces the concern of omitted variable
bias if the Korean wave is correlated with the supply-side shocks such as improvement in the
Korean product quality. It also helps control for general shifts in the Korean trade structure. For
example, South Korea’s industrial specialization has moved upstream, with downstream tasks being
relocated overseas in the past two decades. As a result, the Korean exports of durable and semi-
durable consumer goods have decreased, while its exports of intermediate and capital goods have
increased dramatically. In contrast, if the Korean wave is to affect the Korean exports via changes
in foreign consumer preferences, we would expect such effects to be stronger on consumer products
3Among those countries, Peru has the largest and most devoted fans. It is reported that Channel 7, one of the
most influential national channels of Peru, aired Korean dramas, instead of the news, in its prime time slot.
4The three dramas are Stairway to Heaven (2009), Take Care of My Lady (2012), and My Wife is a Superwoman
(2013).
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than capital/intermediate goods. Thus, it is important to control for these confounding supply-side
factors. Second, we address any remaining concerns that the Korean wave and the Korean exports
may be determined by some unobserved common factors by showing that the trade effects of the
Korean wave are systematically heterogeneous across types of goods. Such heterogeneity cannot
be explained by plausible alternative hypotheses (common factors), but is perfectly consistent with
the demand-driven hypothesis.
First, we find that more TV show exports significantly increase foreign female visitors to Korea
and Korea’s exports of women’s clothing, while the effects are much smaller for men. It is well
known that women are stronger fans for the Korean soap operas and K-pop music.5 This result
strongly supports the demand-side preference mechanism, because supply-side factors can hardly
generate such gender bias within finely disaggregated product/service categories. The most striking
result appears in cosmetics, an iconic women’s product. We find that doubling the Korean TV show
exports increases Korean exports of cosmetic products by 40% (the total TV show exports have
grown about tenfold during 2002–2014). Further, we find that doubling the TV show exports
increases exports of consumer goods by 16%, while it has no effects on capital or intermediate
goods. When we refine the set of consumer goods to those that are identified by surveys to have
been heavily influenced by the Korean wave, we find that the effect on these “Korean wave goods”
is even larger at 26%. That the result with the more specific indicator is stronger is consistent with
the proposed preference mechanism and increases our confidence in the estimation results. Lastly,
we note that there exist significantly positive Korean-wave effects even for foods and clothes, which
are not often advertised through the mass media in foreign countries, suggesting the power of
preference diffusion. Relatedly, the Korean TV show exports are found to have promoted Korean
outward FDI, and such effects are significantly larger in sectors that embody stronger country-of-
origin symbolic values (such as restaurants, entertainment, grocery stores, hair salons and aesthetic
clinics) than the other sectors. Collectively, the results suggest a strong causal effect of the Korean
wave on foreign consumer preferences and demand behaviors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related literatures.
Section 3 documents measurement of the Korean wave. Section 4 proposes plausible mechanisms
through which the global spread of Korean pop culture affects Korea’s exports of goods and services.
In Section 5, we build a simple model and derive the estimation frameworks. Section 6 describes
the estimation strategies and results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The current studies on the Korean wave are mostly conducted by the Korean government agencies
or foundations (MOFA, 2015; KOTRA, 2011; KOTRA and KOFICE, 2015; KOFICE, 2015a,b)
in the form of summary reports. There also exist economic analysis on the subject by Korean
5This gender bias can be seen from the viewership of online video platforms. For example, the largest online video
website Iqiyi in China reports the gender composition of the viewers for each video. More than 70% of the viewers
are female for most Korean dramas.
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researchers, but these studies typically cannot identify robust evidence on the causal effects of the
Korean wave on aggregate bilateral exports. See for example, Park and Choe (2008, 2009) and
Choi (2012). Indeed, as we will demonstrate with our data below, one cannot find robust effect
estimates of the Korean wave by exploiting only country and time variations. The product variation
(in addition to the country-time variation) is the key to the identification.
In using the Korean TV show exports as a measure of cultural influence, our study is related
to the literature that studies the economic and social impacts of the media. As the survey by
DellaVigna and Ferrara (2015) indicates, exposure to the media contents could lead to imitative
behaviors. For example, Disdier et al. (2010a) show that exposure to foreign media contents affect
French parents’ naming pattern through selective imitation. Jensen and Oster (2009) demonstrate
that introduction of cable television is associated with increases in women’s autonomy, and decreases
in fertility and son preferences in rural India. Similarly, Chong and Ferrara (2009) find that the
availability of the TV signals significantly raised the divorce rate in Brazil.6 On the other hand,
Bursztyn and Cantoni (2016) find that exposure to Western TV signals in the former East Germany
affects the composition of consumption biased in favor of categories of goods with a high intensity of
pre-reunification advertisement. In our study, we show that both mechanisms (preference diffusion
and advertisement) play important roles in the Korean wave’s influence on consumption behaviors.
The paper is closely related to the literature that studies the effect of cultural affinity on trade.
For example, Guiso et al. (2009) show that lower trust reduces bilateral trade across countries.
Similarly, Felbermayr and Toubal (2010), Disdier and Mayer (2007), and Disdier et al. (2010b)
construct alternative proxies for cultural proximity and document their positive effects on trade
volumes. In general, this literature does not differentiate whether the cultural proximity variable
affects trade through lower trade costs (on the supply-side) or stronger preferences (on the demand-
side). On the other hand, there exist several papers that focus on the supply-side. For example,
Melitz (2008), Melitz and Toubal (2014), and Egger and Lassmann (2015) study the role of common
language in lowering communication costs. In this paper, we focus on the demand-side changes in
consumer preferences due to the Korean wave. As indicated by the discussions in the introduction,
the reach of the Korean wave is not systematically related to any conventional cultural proximity
measures (such as language, religion, ethnicity, or physical distance).7 Thus, it offers a distinct
source of cultural shocks that vary across a long period of time and a large sample of countries.
The heterogeneous pattern of the trade effects found across products is consistent with system-
atic heterogeneous responses in foreign consumer preferences to the Korean wave, but difficult to
reconcile with supply-side shocks.
This paper is also related to the growing literature on the role of information in trade. To
illustrate, Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Wagner et al. (2002) find that ethnic networks facilitate
information flow and help match foreign buyers and sellers, which promotes international trade by
6See also Kearney and Levine (2015), Olken (2009), and Ferrara et al. (2012) for the effect of media on teen
pregnancy, social capital, and fertility rates, respectively.
7In fact, the Korean language is considered as a “language isolate,” sharing no genealogical relationship with other
languages (see, e.g., Ethonologue).
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lowering search costs. Cristea (2011) shows that high-quality information flow facilitated by in-
person business meetings increases international trade. Allen (2014) demonstrates that information
frictions are quantitatively important in regional agricultural trade in the Philippines. Like the
literature on communication costs discussed above, this literature has predominantly focused on
the supply-side. Our work contributes to the literature by showing that cultural information flows
on the demand-side can have substantial impacts on international trade as well.
3 Korean Wave and Data
In this section, we document the measurement of the Korean wave. Details on the trade data and
the other control variables used in the analysis can be found in the Appendix.
3.1 South Korea’s TV program exports
We compile a cross-country panel dataset of South Korea’s TV program exports for the period of
1998–2014. The data are sourced from the “Annual Report on the Actual Condition of Korean
Broadcasting Industry” by Korea Communications Commissions, a government agency. The report
is published annually since year 2001, but with data dating back to year 1998. This publication
reports South Korea’s TV program exports (excluding exports for overseas Koreans) to over 150
countries for each genre (drama, reality shows, music, documentary, sports, movies, etc.). The
publication also separately reports the aggregate TV program exports for the overseas Korean
across the world. We allocate the sum across countries by the proportion of overseas Koreans
residing in a country, and incorporate it in the total TV show export to each country. Note that
the lump-sum export value for the overseas Korean is trivial, at less than 0.5% compared to the
total TV show exports (as of 2014).
Figure 1 illustrates the trend of the aggregate Korean TV program exports. It has grown
substantially from US$8 to US$336 million during the period 1997–2014.8 On the other hand, the
corresponding imports only increased slightly from US$57 to US$64 million. Figure 2 shows that
the genre composition is highly biased toward dramas, which account for 90% of the total TV show
exports on average during 2010–2013, followed by reality shows at 5%. Figure 3 illustrates the
TV program exports to a subset of destinations for each year in 2001, 2004, and 2014. We see
exponential increases of Korean TV show exports to Japan, China, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam,
Thailand, etc. In contrast, the TV show export values stay close to zero in countries such as India,
Russia, France, and the UK. Note that the official export values likely have under-represented the
actual extent of culture exposure, because many people watch the Korean TV shows using the
internet.9 Nonetheless, the TV show export data provide an excellent measure of the Korean wave,
8The aggregate Korean TV program exports are available since year 1997, although the bilateral exports are only
available since year 1998 (Korea Communications Commissions, 2001–2015).
9For example, the Korean drama series My Love from Another Star (2014) recorded over 6 billion viewership on
the Chinese online video platform Iqiyi over the past three years. However, South Korea sold the TV program at
only about US$3.5 million, while Iqiyi enjoyed over US$100 million profit within only several months of the release
6
as it exhibits substantial variations across years and countries.
The global spread of Korean pop music is another key feature of the Korean wave. As shown in
Figure 4, the export value of K-pop has grown dramatically from US$22 million to US$381 million
during 2005–2015, while music imports by South Korea increased only from US$8 million to US$14
million. Many countries’ enthusiasm for the Korean culture started with its soap operas, before
spilling over to the K-pop music. Accordingly, Figure 4 shows that the exports of the K-pop music
started increasing dramatically only around 2008, several years after the success of Korean TV
dramas overseas. Unfortunately, data on bilateral exports of K-pop music does not exist, so we
cannot incorporate it systematically in our analysis. However, it is likely that Korean TV shows
have caused greater impacts on Korea’s merchandise exports than K-pop music, because viewers
of Korean TV shows spend an extended period of time experiencing indirectly a large array of
the Korean culture (e.g., the fashion, foods, and electronic products used by the characters in the
TV shows). The exposure to the Korean culture is thus likely richer through the contents of soap
operas than music clips, leading to potentially stronger affinity for Korean goods and services.
3.2 Popularity Index
In addition to the overseas sales of the Korean TV programs, we construct an alternative measure
that focuses on how intensely and extensively people in a country follow the Korean pop culture.
To do this, we identify the criteria and classify countries into five levels of popularity with which
the Korean pop culture is received in the country. We use the following Korean government agency
reports that document the situation of the Korean wave in more than 100 countries. The documents
used include: (1) “2015 Global Trend in Korean Wave,” published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the Korea Foundation (MOFA, 2015), (2) “2015 Korean Wave White Paper,” published by the
Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange (KOFICE, 2015a), and (3) various reports
and articles provided by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA, 2011; KOTRA
and KOFICE, 2015), the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA),10 and the Korea International
Trade Association (KITA).11 For example, these documents provide the audience ratings of popular
Korean soap operas in each country, the viewership on major internet video platforms and the
demographic composition of the viewers. The reports also provide general observations on the
Korean wave in each country — for example, how easily one can hear K-pop music on the streets,
how popular and widespread Korean restaurants are, and what the country’s media say about the
Korean pop culture and its associated celebrities.
Based on these reports, we define the following criteria and classify countries into one of the
five categories. This gives a cross-section of ratings for over 100 countries as of 2015 (because most
of the documents relied upon are published in 2015).
Level 1 (Not Interested): Most people in the country are not interested in the Korean TV
(as reported in numerous online news articles in South Korea).
10http://www.kocca.kr.
11http://iit.kita.net.
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shows or K-pop music, and not aware of the Korean wave phenomenon. A total of 47 countries
belong to this category: including India, Pakistan, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, the UK, Germany,
and Spain.
Level 2 (Recognized): The K-pop music (or Korean soap operas) are very popular among
a small fraction of the population, to the degree that the national media give major coverages of
the phenomenon. A total of 25 countries belong to this category: including Russia, Zimbabwe,
Canada, the US, Israel, France, Chile, Mexico, Argentina, UAE, and Morocco.
Level 3 (Somewhat Popular): The majority of the population have experienced the Korean
soap operas, and they are popular at a moderate degree. The K-pop music is highly popular among
the majority of teens and early twenties. A total of 14 countries belong to this category: including
Iran, Hungary, Romania, Paraguay, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Bulgaria, Bolivia, and Ukraine.
Level 4 (Popular): Almost everyone in the country is likely to admit that the Korean soap
operas and K-pop music have been very popular. Due to its popularity, the major channels of the
country have been airing a number of Korean TV shows during prime time slots for many years.
The 7 countries that belong to this category are: Uzbekistan, Peru, Panama, Ecuador, Laos, Cuba,
and El Salvador.
Level 5 (Very Popular): The Korean wave started from these countries between 1997 and
2003 without any promotion efforts by Korea. Numerous series of Korean dramas have been
extremely popular, to the extent that the country’s government publicly expresses concerns over
the effects of the Korean wave on its citizens. Because the local government restricts the broadcasts
of Korean soap operas, people in these countries actively use online video platforms to watch new
and current Korean TV shows. A total of 16 countries belong to this category: China, Vietnam,
Thailand, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Mongolia,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Brunei and South Korea.
Figure 5 illustrates the geographical reach of the Korean wave measured by the popularity index.
The countries classified as Level 5 (very popular) are typically East Asian, South East Asian, and
Central and West Asian countries. The total population of these countries exceeds 30% of the
world population. Remarkably, the Korean wave extends beyond Korea’s immediate neighbors and
reaches countries as far as Ecuador, and as unexpected as Cuba, Iran, Morocco and Zimbabwe.
4 Mechanism
Based on the Korean government agency reports and the literature on the impact of the media, we
propose that the Korean wave could have affected the foreign consumer demand for Korean products
through the following mechanisms: (i) the diffusion of preferences and (ii) advertisement. While
the second mechanism is limited to the products that are advertised (through product placement
or celebrity promotion), the first mechanism is potentially far-reaching if consumers’ affinity for
Korean products improves in general as a result of exposure to the Korean pop culture.
First, as the literature on the impact of the media suggests, exposure to the media content
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could induce powerful imitation effect on its viewers. Similar imitative behaviors could develop
when foreign consumers watch the Korean dramas. To provide some evidence on this mechanism,
Figure 6 presents the survey results of 6,500 foreign participants across the world conducted by
KOFICE (2015b) for people who have experienced the Korean pop culture. Interestingly, over 50%
of the people surveyed responded that they become interested in Korean foods and visiting Korea
after watching Korean TV shows. Because one’s demand for foreign foods and travel is highly
dependent on tastes and cultural preferences (rather than the objective quality of the product),
these results provide strong support for the mechanism of preference diffusion. In fact, 45% of
the sample replied that they become interested in purchasing ‘Korean products in general’ after
experiencing the Korean pop culture.
It is plausible that the power of imitation is so strong that viewers not only develop desire to
experience Korean culture, products, and services, but also fundamentally change their perception
about South Korea. For example, in 1990, 50.8% of the Japanese respondents had negative feelings
toward Korea according to the surveys conducted by the Cabinet Office, Government of Japan.12
However, the Japanese perception of Korea had dramatically turned around, after the Korean
drama Winter Sonata was aired in Japan with multiple encore runs in 2003–2004. In 2004, 56.7%
of the respondents had positive views toward Korea. According to another survey conducted by
KOTRA (2005), the positive rating was 66.6% in 2004 and increased to 77.8% in 2005. Such positive
images of Korea could in turn affect the consumer behavior through the country-of-origin effect
(Obermiller and Spangenberg, 1989; Ozsomer and Cavusgil, 1991; Elliott and Cameron, 1994).13
Second, recognizing the strong imitation effects induced by the Korean pop culture, Korean
firms have often exploited the Korean wave phenomenon in their marketing strategies. To illustrate,
Korean firms often sponsor the production of soap operas on the condition that their products be
placed naturally in the soap opera scenes. These include, e.g., cosmetics, home appliances, or
electronics. The promotion effects can be substantial. As an example, when Descendants of the
Sun was released in China on the online video website Iqiyi in 2016, the sales of the compact
powder used in the drama by the main actress increased by ten-times compared to the same period
in the previous year.14 Celebrity branding is also heavily used by many Korean multinationals (e.g.,
Samsung, LG, Hyundai and cosmetic companines). They strategically use Korean-wave celebrities
who have strong persuasive power on foreign viewers to promote the sales abroad. To illustrate,
when the Korean drama Descendants of the Sun had a sensational hit in China and the region,
J.Estina and Laneige (two Korean brands that sell jewelry and skin-care products) saw a sudden
increase in their sales (and their stock prices) during the period. In fact, the two brands were using
the lead actress of the drama in their advertisements.
12https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/h26-gaiko/zh/z11.html.
13In general, the country-of-origin effects could be driven by demand-side preference changes or supply-side quality
changes. In the case of the Korean wave, the former plays a dominant role, because the drastic changes in the sales
of several Korean products can hardly be explained by their quality changes.
14Similarly, the lipstick that she used in the drama was immediately sold out within three days, based on one of
the largest online shopping websites (SK Planet) selling Korean products.
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5 Framework and Identification Strategies
5.1 Framework
We apply the conceptual framework of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) [AvW] and allow the
two channels discussed above to work through the preference parameter. Let there be C countries
and I industries, with an upper-tier Cobb-Douglas preference (and expenditure share αi) over the
industries and a lower-tier CES preference over goods imported from different sources of origin
within each industry. Specifically, in each industry i, goods are differentiated by the country of
origin, and buyers in each country c choose imports qoci from origin o to maximize the lower-tier
utility, (∑
o
(boci)
1/σ (qoci)
(σ−1)/σ
)σ/(σ−1)
subject to
∑
o
pociqoci = αiYc (1)
where boci is the taste parameter for goods produced in o perceived by buyers in country c, which
can vary across industries i. The parameter σ > 1 indicates the elasticity of substitution across
sources of imports; Yc is country c’s nominal income; and poci ≡ poiτoci is the destination price
equal to the exporter’s supply price poi scaled up by the iceberg trade cost factor τoci. Solving
the utility maximization problem of (1) gives us the export values from country o to country c in
industry i:
Expoci = boci
(
poiτoci
Pci
)(1−σ)
αiYc (2)
where Pci is the consumer price index of industry i in country c given by Pci =
[∑
o boci (poiτoci)
1−σ
]1/(1−σ)
.
Since the sample we will study is fixed in terms of Korea as an origin, we will omit the origin
subscript below. We hypothesize that the Korean wave affects the foreign consumer preferences
towards Korean products over time bci,t through the two mechanisms (preference diffusion and
marketing) as discussed in Section 4. Specifically, we assume that the taste parameter is a log-
linear function of the lagged Korean TV show exports to the country (TV showExpc,t−1), and a
destination-industry parameter shifter (b¯ci):
bci,t = b¯ci · TV showExpθic,t−1 · eεci,t , (3)
where εci,t absorbs any other idiosyncratic shocks to the taste parameter over time not accounted
for by the TV show exports. Note that we allow the elasticity θi (of the taste parameter with
respect to the TV show exports) to vary across industries i.
Combine (2) and (3), and assume that the unobserved trade cost τci,t is log-linear in observable
trade cost proxies Xc,t. We obtain an estimable equation:
lnExpci,t = θi · lnTV showExpc,t−1 + δ lnGDPc,t + γiXc,t + uci,t, (4)
where the error term uci,t absorbs the destination-industry specific effect b¯ci, the Korea-industry-
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time specific effect pi,t, the industry specific effect αi, the shocks to the taste parameter εci,t, and any
other unobserved variables. We include in the list of trade cost proxies Xc,t: the physical distance
between Korea and the destination (lnDistc), the regional trade agreement dummy (RTAc,t), the
Korean embassy dummy (Embassyc,t), the number of Koreans residing in the destination country
(lnKoreansc,t), and the cross exchange rate (lnExRatec,t, Korean Won / destination currency).
Framework 1: In the basic exercise, we focus on specific industries and estimate (4) for each
of the industries. This leaves a panel data structure with variations across destination and time.
We allow for two alternative specifications of the error term such that:
lnExpci,t = λt + θi · lnTV showExpc,t−1 + δ lnGDPc,t + γiXc,t + ci,t , for each i, (5)
lnExpci,t = λc + θi · lnTV showExpc,t−1 + δ lnGDPc,t + γiXc,t + ci,t , for each i. (6)
In (5), we include the year fixed-effects (FEs) and exploit the variations across countries, while (6)
controls for country FEs and relies on with-in country variations across time.15
Framework 2: In the second framework, we pool observations across industries. To control
for the complicated error structure in uci,t, we do the following. First, we take the difference of (4)
across time within a period. For example, ∆ lnExpci ≡ lnExpci,2015− lnExpci,2002 if the period of
interest is 2002–2015, and similarly ∆uci ≡ uci,2015 − uci,2002. This eliminates all the destination-
industry and industry FEs (such as b¯ci and αi). Second, to control for the Korea-industry-time
FEs (such as pi,t), we include an industry-specific constant in the difference equation. This allows
for heterogeneous growth rates of Korean exports across industries. Third, to control for potential
heterogeneous growth rates of Korean exports across destinations, we construct destination-specific
growth rates of Korean exports during the period ∆GoodsExpc ≡
∑
i ∆ lnExpci/I, or simply
include a destination-specific constant in the difference equation. Finally, we assume that the
preference elasticity varies across industries in a systematic manner. For example, one of the
specifications we will use is θi = β1 · ConsumerGoodsi + β2, where ConsumerGoodsi is a dummy
variable that indicates whether an industry belongs to the set of consumer goods, while β2 represents
the base effect of the Korean TV show export on non-consumer goods, and β1 the additional effect
on the consumer goods. In sum, the estimation equations are:
∆ lnExpci = gi + β1 · ConsumerGoodsi ·∆ lnTV showExpc + β2 ·∆ lnTV showExpc
+ δ∆ lnGDPc + γ∆Xc + ∆uci , (7)
∆ lnExpci = gi + β1 · ConsumerGoodsi ·∆ lnTV showExpc + β2 ·∆ lnTV showExpc
+ δ∆ lnGDPc + γ∆Xc + ∆GoodsExpc + ∆uci , (8)
∆ lnExpci = gi + β1 · ConsumerGoodsi ·∆ lnTV showExpc + gc + ∆uci . (9)
Note that we have relaxed the unit income elasticity implied by theory and allow δ to differ from one.
15Note that lnExRatec,t will be included in (6) but not in (5), because only the within-country variations in
exchange rates are meaningful, while the exchange rates across countries are not comparable. Note also that lnDistc
will be dropped in (6) as it will be absorbed by the country fixed-effects.
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The coefficients γ on the trade-cost proxies in principle can vary across industries as Framework 1
explicitly allows. In Framework 2, however, we do not further model how the elasticity of the
trade-cost proxies differ across industries. One can take their estimates as the mean across sectors.
5.2 Identification Strategies
The estimation equations (7)–(9) are robust to a large set of unobservables as suggested above.
First, the Korea’s export structure has exhibited systematic differential trend across sectors. For
example, by the UN Broad Economic Categories (see Table 1), the Korean exports of nondurable
consumer goods (BEC 63, excluding foods) — which mostly consist of cosmetics and skin-care
products — have increased substantially during 2003–2015 as shown in Figure 7. In contrast, the
exports of semi-durable consumer goods — which mostly consist of clothing — have decreased sig-
nificantly, because many Korean plants in the industry have moved to nearby low-wage countries
during the period.16 Meanwhile, exports of intermediate and capital goods have grown dramati-
cally, as South Korea’s specialization has moved to upstream industries. This will confound the
identification of the Korean-wave effect because Korea’s TV show exports happen to grow dramat-
ically over the same time period. The inclusion of gi in (7)–(9) controls for such heterogeneous
export growth rates across industries.
Second, it is plausible that the increased popularity of Korean culture in a country has occurred
simultaneously with some unobserved factors that improved Korea’s trade relationship with the des-
tination country. Such destination-specific shocks to the trend in the Korean TV program exports
and in its merchandise exports, however, would be controlled for by gc in (9) or by ∆GoodsExpc
in (8).
Third, it is also possible that technology changes such as the availability of internet have enabled
the Korean wave to develop worldwide, and at the same time lowered the communication and
information costs of international trade. Again, such unobserved shocks would be controlled for by
the gi and gc terms for the industry- or country-specific trend, and by the differencing if they are
country-industry time invariant.
Finally, we demonstrate that the Korean-wave effects are systematically different across types
of goods and that such heterogeneity is difficult to reconcile with any supply-side factors but
highlight the importance of the demand-driven mechanisms. For example, as introduced in (7),
we examine whether the Korean-wave effects are stronger on consumer goods than on capital
or intermediate goods (since consumer goods embody stronger cultural contents). If this is the
case despite Korea’s strengthening comparative advantage in non-consumer goods as suggested by
Figure 7, this will imply that the preference mechanism plays a dominant role. We will also exploit
the fact that women have shown stronger affinity for the Korean pop culture and test whether
exports of goods/services for women are more responsive to the Korean wave. More identification
strategies based on the variations across types of goods will be elaborated in the next section. Last
16The Korean exports of durable consumer goods had increased substantially until 2004 due to productivity growth,
but have decreased since then with rising outward FDI.
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but not least, we conduct falsification tests by showing that future changes in TV show exports
have no effects on past changes in goods exports. These tests ensure that our results are not driven
by some common long-run factors that determine both Korean merchandise and cultural exports.
Extensive robustness checks are presented along with the main analysis.
We close this section by countering the potential concern of reverse causality (that the Korea’s
exports of goods/services have caused the overseas popularity of the Korean pop culture). First,
in the regression, we use lagged TV show exports in predicting the future merchandise trade flows.
Second, the falsification tests confirm that these two series are not co-determined in the long run by
some unobserved factors. Third, the systematic differences in the economic impact of TV program
exports across types of goods/services are difficult to reconcile with shocks to goods/services trade
flows, which then affect the demand for Korean TV shows. For example, it is hard to argue that
Korean hotels and restaurants are systematically biased in their services toward women, who are
then led to watch more Korean TV programs. Similarly, it is unlikely that the clothes produced
in Korea are systematically biased toward women’s in terms of qualities that lead to stronger
preferences by females for Korean TV shows. Fourth, if merchandise trade flows cause demand for
TV shows, we would expect large exporting countries of consumer goods such as Japan to see a
similar ‘Japanese wave’, but the Japanese TV and music programs in terms of overseas popularity
simply cannot match that of the Korean nowadays. Finally, it is instructive to use the example
of Gangnam Style (2012) to show the point. The K-pop song Gangnam Style (2012) — which
was composed targeting only the Koreans — rose to the top in the music charts of many other
countries within several months after its release. Its extreme popularity was driven purely by the
viewer’s demand for fun value (DellaVigna and Ferrara, 2015), and not led by any economic events
in Korea. Indeed, this is how the Korean pop culture has grown popular overseas in general.
6 Evidence on the Korean-wave effects and the importance of the
Preference Mechanism
This section provides econometric evidence that more exports of the Korean TV shows to a country,
by changing its consumers’ preferences, induce more demand for and hence imports of Korean goods
and services. We employ three identification strategies. First, given the observation that the Korean
pop culture has attracted more fans from women than men, we test whether the TV show effect is
stronger on goods/services designed for women. Second, we examine whether the effect is stronger
for final consumer goods than intermediate or capital goods, given that consumer goods embody
stronger cultural contents. Third, to identify the effects of preference diffusion (beyond direct
marketing effects), we study the effect on goods/services that are rarely advertised. We explain the
estimation approaches, results, and their implications below.
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6.1 Gender-Biased Preferences
It is a well-documented fact that women have shown stronger affinity for the Korean soap operas
and K-pop music in the Korean-wave phenomenon. For example, the largest online video website
Iqiyi in China reports the gender composition of the viewers for each video. More than 70% of the
viewers are female for most Korean TV dramas. Given that women consume Korean pop culture
more than men, our proposed mechanisms in Section 4 imply that products and services designed
for women will be more responsive to the Korean wave. We examine this hypothesis based on
three industries whose sales are observed to be highly sensitive to the Korean-wave phenomenon:
tourism, beauty products (e.g., skin-care and cosmetics), and fashion goods. A positive finding
will provide strong evidence for the preference mechanism, because it is difficulty to argue that the
production technology or the qualities of the Korean products/services are systematically biased
across genders.
6.1.1 Female versus Male Tourists
As suggested by Onishi (2005) in the New York Times, Korea had been one of the least popular
tourist destination till around 2002, but the trend has since shifted due to the Korean wave:
tourists to South Korea have more than quadrupled during 2003–2016 as shown in Figure 8.17
As an illustration, after the Korean soap opera Winter Sonata was aired in Japan, 74 thousand
Japanese traveled to the region Kwangwon-do in Korea, where the soap opera was filmed. The
province enjoyed a 884% increase in the number of tourists compared to the previous year. The facts
that women have stronger affinity for the Korean pop culture and that tourism is highly influenced
by the Korean wave suggest the first testable hypothesis: The Korean wave has attracted more
female visitors than the male visitors. We examine this using a cross-country panel dataset on the
annual number of female and male visitors to South Korea for the period 2003–2015 from the Korea
Tourism Organization. This is an excellent test of the demand-side mechanism, because tourism is
strongly driven by consumers’ tastes and preferences.
Columns 1–3 of Table 2 provide the estimation results of equations (5) and (6), using the
proportion of female visitors (percentage of total visitors) as the dependent variables.18 The results
show that the Korean TV show exports have led to an increased proportion of female visitors
to Korea. This provides the first piece of evidence on the gender-biased effect of the Korean
wave. The result in Column 1 indicates that when based on the cross-country variation (with the
year FEs controlled), doubling the TV show exports increases the percentage of female visitors
by 1.99 percentage points. This estimate is not only statistically significant but also economically
important, considering that Korea’s total TV show exports have grown more than tenfold during
2002–2014.
17The slight decrease in tourists in 2015 was due to the serious outbreak of epidemic disease MERS in South Korea.
18Note that we split the log GDP variables in equations (5) and (6) into log population and log per capita GDP,
because each has interesting implications on tourism. In addition, we exclude countries whose per capita GDP in
2015 is less than US$4,000, because visitors from these countries tend to consist of temporary workers who come to
South Korea to work in construction sites or factories.
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Column 2 suggests that the effect estimate becomes insignificant when we rely on only within-
country variations. A plausible reason is that the within-country momentum in traveling to Korea
by females might become strong enough only after the women have consumed large amounts of
Korean pop culture, because males have traditionally dominated females in international travel.
Taking this into consideration, we create a dummy Popularc, which indicates whether a country c
is highly influenced by the Korean wave with a popularity index of 4 (popular) or 5 (very popular).
This indicator variable is included as an interaction term with the Korean TV show exports.
The result in Column 3 indicates that the effect is statistically significant at 1.89 for these (and
only these) countries. The findings on the percentage of female visitors are thus very similar in
magnitudes based on either cross-country or within-country variations.
As a robustness check, we also conduct the analysis for the number of tourists (instead of
visitors). A visitor is classified as a tourist if he/she declares tourism as the main purpose of visit.
Unfortunately, the tourist data are not separately available for females versus males. Columns
4–6 show that the patterns are consistent with the conclusion above. Doubling the Korean TV
show exports raises tourists to Korea by 19% based on cross-country variations, while based on
within-country variations, the effects are mostly driven by source countries where the Korean pop
culture is highly influential.
6.1.2 Beauty Product Exports
According to the survey conducted by KOFICE (2015b), more than 60% and 50% of the 6500
foreign respondents consider ‘attractive appearances of the actors and actresses’ and ‘leading the
fashion and beauty trend’ as the main pull factor of Korean soap operas, respectively. As a matter
of fact, Korean exports of beauty products (including, e.g., skin-care products, cosmetics, and hair
preparations) have increased dramatically by more than tenfold during 2003–2015. As shown in
Figure 9, the growth in the Korean exports of beauty products is exponential in destinations where
the Korean pop culture is very popular (e.g., China, Japan, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam). In
contrast, the Korean exports stay relatively flat to the UK, Germany, and France, where the Korean
pop culture is not popular. These export patterns of Korean beauty products suggest that changes
in foreign consumer preferences induced by the Korean wave are the most plausible mechanism,
because supply-side shocks such as product quality improvement cannot explain such systematic
heterogeneities across destinations and the dramatic growth in exports to specific markets.
Table 4 reports the estimation results based on equations (5) and (6), when we use the Korean
beauty-product exports as the dependent variable. It is calculated as the total Korean exports in
the industries of HS 3304, 3305, 3307, and 3402 under the UN Harmonized System Classification
(see Table 3 for the detailed description). Based on the cross-country variation, Column 1 shows
that doubling the Korean TV show exports leads to a 40% increase in beauty product exports.
On the other hand, the effect estimate based on within-country variations in Column 2 is smaller
at 25%. Still, Column 3 shows that for countries with a K-wave popularity index of 4 or 5 (very
popular), the within-country variation in trade is highly responsive to the Korean wave with the
15
corresponding effect at 37% (in comparison with 5% for the other countries). Given that beauty
products are mainly consumed by women, the results in this section offer another layer of evidence
on the importance of the preference mechanism in the Korean wave phenomenon.
6.1.3 Women’s versus Men’s Clothing Exports
Following the same line of arguments, we test whether the TV show effect is stronger on Korea’s
exports of women’s clothing than men’s. As discussed in Section 5, Korea’s exports of clothing
have been in the decline in the past two decades due to production offshoring (see Figure 7 on
semi-durables). To control for such confounding effects, we use the difference estimation equations
(7)–(9) in Framework 2 that pools observations across industries and allows for industry-specific
export trend. We include in the analysis all the HS 4-digit industries classified under ‘Section XI
— Textiles and Textile Articles’ (see Panel B of Table 3). In this set of industries, HS 61 and 62
(clothing) are final consumer goods, while the rest are mostly intermediate goods (such as textiles)
or goods conceptually unrelated to the Korean wave (such as carpets and worn clothing). The
clothing industries (HS 61 & 62) can be further classified into women’s and men’s clothing using the
HS nomenclature: the eight even-number HS 4-digit sectors (6102–6108 & 6202–6208) correspond
to the women’s clothing, while the odd-number sectors the men’s (see Panel C of Table 3).
To test the preference hypothesis, we construct two dummies: ‘WomensClothingi’ and ‘MensClothingi’
that indicate whether a HS 4-digit industry i is one of the eight women’s clothing industries and
men’s, respectively. The base category thus includes all industries in textiles and textile arti-
cles that are not clothing. We replace the ConsumerGoodsi dummy with the WomensClothingi
and MensClothingi dummies in equations (7)–(9). Thus, the estimation equation will have two
interaction terms: ∆ lnTV showExpc interacted with WomensClothingi and MensClothingi, re-
spectively. We expect that: (i) the two coefficients on the interaction terms be both positive and
significant, if the Korean wave has stronger effects on consumer goods than intermediate goods; (ii)
the coefficient on the interaction term with WomensClothingi be larger than for MensClothingi,
if women have responded more strongly to the Korean soap operas than men.
Table 5 presents the results. Analysis in Columns 1–3 are performed over the period of 2002–
2015, while Columns 4–6 over two stacked periods of 2002–2007 and 2007–2015 (allowing for
industry-period specific export trend).19 Columns 1 & 4 show that the Korean wave has sig-
nificantly larger positive impacts on women’s clothing exports than on men’s: in particular, the
results in Column 4 imply that doubling the TV show exports leads to a 27% increase in women’s
clothing exports, while the effect is only 13% for men’s. This gender-biased effect strongly supports
the demand-side mechanism. In addition, both coefficient estimates for women’s and men’s clothing
are positive and significant, consistent with the first hypothesis that the TV show effect be stronger
on consumer goods than on intermediate goods. The coefficient estimates on ∆ lnTV showExpc
are insignificant (Columns 1 & 4), suggesting that the Korean wave has no statistically significant
impact on textiles other than clothing.
19We choose year 2007 instead of 2008 or 2009 to avoid the distortion created by the 2008 financial crisis.
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Next, to address potential unobserved confounding factors as discussed in Section 5.2, we con-
struct destination-specific export growth rates ∆GoodsExpc, defined as the mean export growth
rates across all HS 4-digit industries under study. In other words, ∆GoodsExpc represents Korea’s
overall export trend (of the industries under study) to a specific destination c. Columns 2 & 5 of Ta-
ble 5 show that the key estimates are robust to the inclusion of ∆GoodsExpc with similar orders of
magnitude. In contrast, many of the other gravity variables lose their significance, suggesting that
the inclusion of ∆GoodsExpc absorbs most of these variables’ explanatory powers. To ensure the
robustness of our results, we further include destination-specific dummies in the difference equation
to control for all potential destination-specific time-variant confounding factors. This means that
all country-specific variables (in difference) are dropped from the equation expect the two inter-
action terms of WomensClothingi and MensClothingi with ∆ lnTV showExpc. Understandably,
this specification is a very demanding specification. It reduces the concern of omitted variable bias,
but also sweeps away any potential base effects of TV show export growth. Nonetheless, Columns
3 & 6 show that the effect continues to be stronger on women’s clothing than men’s.
Last but not least, we conduct falsification tests by regressing past (1991–2001) changes in
clothing and textile exports on future (2003–2013) changes in TV show exports (we use the period
1991–2001 for the other control variables as well).20 The falsification test framework is in part
motivated by Autor et al. (2013). The results in Panel B of Table 5 show that there is no correlation
between changes in Korea’s clothing exports in the 1990s and changes in Korea’s future TV show
exports in the 2000s, and there is no systematic difference in the effects on women’s versus men’s
clothing exports as well. This is true in either long-period growth regressions (1991–2001) or
stacked-period regressions (1991–1996, 1996–2001). These falsification test results thus alleviate
the concern that our findings of positive Korean-wave effects might be driven by some long-run
coincidental factors.
To summarize, the results in this section support the demand-side driven mechanism that the
Korean wave has changed consumers’ preferences and their consumption behaviors. That the
effects are stronger for products/services used by women is especially revealing of this preference
mechanism, because such gender-biased trade effects within fine product categories is difficult to
reconcile with supply-side explanations.
6.2 Consumer Goods Effects
In this section, we extend the analysis to all HS 4-digit industries and examine whether there are
systematic differences in the Korean-wave effects across types of goods in ways that are consistent
with the preference mechanism. In particular, we test two hypotheses: (i) the effects of the Korean
pop culture on exports are stronger for final consumer goods than capital or intermediate goods; (ii)
the effects are further stronger on the subset of consumer goods whose sales overseas are documented
20The exception is the number of overseas Koreans, for which we use the future period values (2003–2013). This is
because its data are not available for the period of 1991–2001. The results are similar if we simply drop this variable
from the regression.
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by surveys/reports to have been directly boosted by the Korean wave. We label them the ‘Korean
wave goods’, following the media. In both exercises, we use the time-difference Framework 2 —
analogous to our earlier analysis of clothing exports — with alternative indicators ConsumerGoodsi
and KoreanWaveGoodsi, respectively.
The exercises in this section serve two purposes. First, it provides an overall assessment of the
Korean-wave effect across all industries. Korean government agencies, and cultural and economic
research institutes, have made tremendous efforts in investigating the economic impacts of the
Korean wave. While their reports focus on documentation and surveys, we provide a first systematic
econometric analysis of the overall effect of Korean wave on Korea’s exports. Second, comparing the
magnitudes of the two effect estimates associated with the two indicators provides cross-validation
of the reliability of our analysis. If the preference mechanism is the key in the Korean-wave
phenomenon, we expect the effect estimate associated with KoreanWaveGoodsi to be larger and
more significant than the estimate associated with ConsumerGoodsi.
6.2.1 Consumer-Goods dummy Specification
We use the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) as shown in Table 1 to identify the consumer
goods: they are Food and beverages—Primary/Processed—Mainly for household consumption, Pas-
senger motor cars, Consumer goods not elsewhere specified—Durable, Semi-durable, and Non-
durable. The indicator ConsumerGoodsi takes on value 1 if a HS 4-digit industry i falls under
these consumer-goods categories and 0 otherwise.21
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results. Consistent with our hypothesis, the estimate implies
that doubling the TV show exports induces a 16% increase in consumer-goods exports, while there
is no significant effect on non-consumer goods. Given that Korea’s TV show exports have grown
more than eightfold over the period of 2002–2015, the implied economic impacts on consumer goods
are substantial. Next, by controlling for Korea’s destination-specific export trend, ∆GoodsExpc,
across all HS 4-digit industries, the effect on the consumer goods remains statistically significant
at 12%. In fact, there appear to be negative effects on non-consumer goods, but the magnitude
is relatively small in comparison with the positive effect on consumer goods. As seen in Table 5,
including the destination-specific export trend, ∆GoodsExpc, absorbs the explanatory power of
most other gravity variables, but leaves the differential positive effect on consumer goods intact.
Finally, by controlling for country FEs (in the difference equation), hence eliminating all country-
specific variables but the interaction term, the effect remains statistically significant at 11% on the
consumer goods. As we break the period into two sub-periods (2002–2007 & 2007–2015) and stack
the observation, the hypothesis continues to hold as indicated in Columns 4–6.
21We use the concordance table between the HS 6-digit sectors and the BEC provided by the UN. About 10%
of the HS 4-digit industries are mapped to both consumer and non-consumer goods, and we drop such industries.
The results in Table 6 remain robust, if we force the problematic industries to be classified as either consumer goods
or non-consumer goods. Tables A.1–A.3 report the results when these double-matching HS 4-digit industries are
classified as consumer goods. The magnitudes of the estimates if we classify them as non-consumer goods generally
fall in between these two sets of estimates (where we simply drop them and where we classify them as consumer
goods).
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In Panel B of Table 6, we conduct falsification tests, by regressing past (1991–2001) changes
in exports of HS 4-digit industries on future (2003–2013) changes in TV show exports. The effect
estimates on the interaction term and the TV show exports are all arbitrarily close to zeros and
statistically insignificant. This increases our confidence that the positive finding above is not due
to spurious correlations. Overall, our findings in Table 6 suggest that the Korean pop culture has
economically and statistically significant impacts on the exports of consumer goods, but not on
capital or intermediate goods.
6.2.2 Korean-Wave Goods dummy Specification
The Korean wave goods as introduced above are often identified by the mass media and government
agency reports/surveys as products whose sales have directly benefited from the Korean wave.
These Korean wave goods are typically food/beverages, cosmetics, clothing/accessories, certain
home appliances, electronic products, and cars. We collect such information and construct the
indicator KoreanWaveGoodsi — which takes on value 1 if a HS 4-digit industry i belongs to the
set of Korean wave goods and 0 otherwise. The industries classified as Korean wave goods are listed
in Panel A of Table 3.
As a preliminary analysis and illustration, we estimate (5) for each of the HS industry clusters
identified as Korean wave goods. The results are summarized in Table 7. We see that exports
of most Korean wave goods are highly responsive to the TV show exports. Most pronounced
impacts are found in beauty products and jewelry, reiterating our earlier conclusion of gender-
biased Korean-wave effects. Economically large and statistically significant effects are also seen in
foods and clothing, and home appliances such as washing machines and refrigerators. However, the
effects are not significant for aircons, TV and cars.
We next use the robust specifications (7)–(9) with the KoreanWaveGoodsi dummy in place
of ConsumerGoodsi. These specifications, by pooling over all HS 4-digit industries, allow us to
control for many potential confounding factors as emphasized in Section 5.2. As shown in Table 8,
doubling the Korean TV show exports raises the exports of Korean wave goods by 26% in the
baseline specification using the long period regression of 2002–2015 (Column 1). The magnitude
of this effect is significantly larger than the estimated effect on general consumer goods (16% cf.
Column 1 of Table 6). This finding, where the effect on the Korean wave goods is larger than on the
consumer goods, holds true throughout all the other specifications in Columns 1–6 of Tables 6 & 8.
These results thus support the second hypothesis that the Korean wave goods are more responsive
than the whole set of consumer goods.
Given the important role of the Korean wave goods in leading the diffusion of preferences for
Korean products, we look further into the impacts in each sub-period of 2002–2007 and 2007–2015
in the next six columns of Table 8. In spite of the shorter time frames and potentially more noises,
the effects on Korean wave goods remain statistically significant and robust as in the benchmark.
The corresponding falsification tests in Table 9 assure that there are no systematic spurious effects
of the future TV show export growth on the past changes in Korea’s exports, across all the twelve
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specifications.
Overall, the results in this section demonstrate that there exist significantly positive effects
of the Korean wave on exports of consumer goods but not on capital or intermediate goods, and
that the effects for the Korean wave goods are further larger than for the consumer goods. These
findings provide further evidence for the demand-side mechanism. It is also worthwhile noting that
during the decade of 2002–2015, Korea’s exports of consumer goods have in general gone downtrend
relative to capital or intermediate goods. This makes the finding of positive cultural effects on the
exports of Korean consumer goods appear even more riveting. In a way, the Korean wave has
helped buck the downward trend of Korean consumer-goods exports, with the Korean wave goods
leading the way.
6.3 Diffusion of Preferences
In this section, we argue and show that of the two mechanisms: (i) diffusion of preferences and
(ii) advertisement, the diffusion of preferences is the dominant driver of the Korean-wave effects
documented above.
First, we argue that without the diffusion of preferences, the advertisement efforts cannot lead
to such phenomenal impacts. For example, despite substantial efforts by the Korean cosmetics firms
to penetrate lucrative markets such as France, UK, US, and Canada, where the Korean pop culture
is not popular, the market shares of Korean beauty products remain negligible. Advertisement
using Korean actresses simply does not work in these countries where the preferences for Korean
products are weak. In contrast, in countries where the Korean wave popularity index is high,
Korean cosmetics firms find it extremely lucrative to ride on the Korean wave by involving Korean
stars in marketing activities. Thus, conceptually, the diffusion of preferences for Korean culture
develop first before the advertisement channel becomes effective.
Next, we present two sets of evidence to support this argument, where the products/services are
typically not advertised via product placement in the Korean TV shows or promoted by celebrity.
First, Korean clothing and foods are rarely advertised overseas.22 However, as we have demon-
strated in Table 5, Korean TV show exports have significant and positive effects on Korea’s exports
of clothing. Similarly, Table 7 suggests that Korea’s exports in many of the food and beverage in-
dustries are highly responsive to the Korean wave. These findings strongly support our hypothesis
above that diffusion of preferences is the key: the label ‘Made in Korea’ or ‘Korean style’ that
emphasizes Korea as the country of origin evokes in foreign consumers the cognitive and affective
effects in their decisions to purchase a product (Obermiller and Spangenberg, 1989; Verlegh and
Steenkamp, 1999). To illustrate, as shown by the survey results in Figure 6, 45% of the 65,000
foreign respondents indicated that they would like to purchase products made in Korea after expe-
riencing the Korean pop culture (and 32% even without knowing the brands, reported in the same
22Though there are some famous Korean clothing brands, those are typically made in and exported from China or
Vietnam. Clothing that are made in and exported from South Korea are mostly individual designer’s clothes, not
marketed on a large scale.
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survey).
Next, we examine the Korean wave’s impacts on South Korea’s outward FDI across countries
and sectors, noting that the flow of Korea’s services via FDI are typically not advertised via the
mass media in foreign countries. The list of sectors are given in Table 10. As in the case of
Korean wave goods, we can identify certain service sectors whose sales likely have benefited from
the Korean wave. For example, Figure 6 shows that more than 25% of the respondents would like
to have Korean medical services, learn the Korean language, and more than 50% would like to eat
and purchase Korean foods, after experiencing the Korean pop culture. Using the same sources
of information (government reports) that helped us define the Korean wave goods, we classify the
FDI sectors in Table 10 into Korean wave service sectors and non-KoreanWaveService sectors. The
Korean wave service sectors include, e.g., Korean restaurants, grocery stores, K-pop concerts and
performances/events of Korean celebrities, aesthetic and medical clinics, language institutes, and
hair salons, which are set up overseas by Koreans.
If the Korean wave has induced the diffusion of foreign consumers’ preferences, we expect Korea’s
FDI in the Korean wave service sectors to be positively affected by the Korean TV show exports.
Table 11 provides a preliminary analysis for each of the seven Korean wave service sectors based on
equation (5), using the FDI flows as the dependent variable. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find
that the Korean wave effects are positive and significant for all the Korean wave service sectors,
except ‘medical services’ whose estimate is positive but not precisely estimated. For example,
doubling the TV show exports increases FDI in restaurants and retail/wholesale services by 23%
and 41%, respectively. Strong impacts are also found for education and personal services (33% and
30%, respectively).23 In contrast, as shown in Table 12, the impacts of Korean TV show exports are
in general absent in the other sectors, including, agriculture, manufacturing, mining, construction,
science and technology, public administration, real estate, and business/finance services. The
exceptions are FDI in shipping, electricity, and waste management, for which we provide some
plausible explanations in the footnote.24
Following the above motivating evidence, we pool observations across sectors and allow the
Korean wave effect to differ across the set of Korean wave service sectors and the set of non-
KoreanWaveService sectors. Unlike the previous analysis for merchandise trade, We do not use
the time-difference equations (7)–(9). This is because Korea’s FDI data at the sectoral level across
23Understandably, FDI in broadcasting and entertainment is strongly associated with Korean TV show exports.
24The positive effect on Korean FDI in shipping is likely an induced demand for logistics services due to increased
sales of Korean wave goods or increased demands for materials and equipments required in the Korean wave service
sectors in the destination. For FDI in electricity and waste management, we suspect that this could be due to the
state-controlled nature of Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), which
are respectively the top 4th and 8th Korean multinationals in 2013. South Korea strongly promoted investment in
energy during the five years of the Lee Myung Bak administration (2008–2012), and the geographical distribution
of these foreign investment tends to coincide with that of the Korean wave. For example, the amount of Korean
outward FDI in energy is topped by Asia and reared by Africa and Middle East (Moon and Yin, 2015). Electricity
generation (by nuclear or fossil fuels) produces waste at each step of the fuel cycles (Tsyplenkov, 1993). Thus, waste
management by environmental regulations is a production process that accompanies energy production. This may
help explain the rise of outward Korean FDI in electricity and in waste management that coincides with the countries
affected by the Korean wave.
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destinations are quite sparse with many zero entries; taking log difference across two years leads to a
large drop in the sample size. Instead, we run the FDI regression in levels, but control for sector-year
and destination FEs. This allows us to control for sector-year and destination-specific unobserved
confounding factors. Table 13 reports the estimation results. Consistent with our preliminary
finding, during the period of 2002–2015, lagged Korean TV show exports have significant and
positive effects on Korean FDI in the Korean wave service sectors, by an elasticity of 0.12, but have
no effects on the other sectors. On the other hand, the falsification tests in Columns 3 & 4 show
that there are no spurious correlations between Korea’s past FDI flows and its future TV show
exports, strengthening the reliability of our results.25
In sum, this section demonstrates that even for Korean goods and services that are rarely
advertised by the mass media, the Korean wave has a significant impact on their overseas sales.
The finding that the effects on women’s clothing (rarely advertised in the mass media) and on
beauty products (intensively advertised by famous Korean actresses) are similar in magnitudes and
both economically large is especially revealing of the preference-diffusion mechanism. Finally, our
finding of a significant and positive effect of the TV show exports on the Korean wave service FDI
sectors reinforce the evidence for this channel.
7 Conclusion
Identifying a causal link from culture to international trade flows is challenging. This is because
the notion of culture is so broad, and culture tends to develop slowly over time and thus highly
correlated with geographic factors. There are also potentially many confounding factors that could
affect both culture and trade flows. This paper exploits the phenomenon of the Korean wave, where
the Korean pop culture dramatically spreads across many countries (regardless of physical distance,
religion, language, and ethnicity differences) in a short time frame, to identify the effect of culture
on consumer preferences. In particular, we assemble a unique dataset on Korean TV program
exports across more than 150 countries for the period of 1998–2014. This measure of culture
shocks is unique because the Korean TV program exports vary substantially across countries and
time, and when combined with disaggregated trade flows across industries, allows us to adopt very
robust estimation specifications that control for several potential unobserved confounding factors
(such as destination-industry time-invariant fixed effects, Korea-industry-specific time-varying fixed
effects, and destination-specific time-varying fixed effects). We hypothesize that the exposures to
the Korean culture affect foreign consumer preferences for the Korean products/services, and test
the implications of this demand-driven mechanism that on the other hand cannot reconcile with
supply-side explanations.
Our estimation results provide strong evidence that increased exposure to Korean pop culture
has changed foreigner consumer preferences for Korean goods/services, and increased Korea’s ex-
25The data on the presence of Korean embassy and the size of overseas Koreans are available only since 1995 and
1997, respectively. Thus, for the falsification tests, we use the future values for these two variables. We also verify
the robustness of the results in Table 13 by dropping these two variables from the regressions.
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ports and FDI in (and only in) relevant industries. First, we find that the impact is stronger for
products/services designed for women, consistent with the fact that proportionally more females
are documented to spend more hours watching Korean TV programs and hence more intensively
exposed to the Korean cultural contents. Second, the effects are found to be significantly positive
for consumer goods while insignificant for capital or intermediate goods, consistent with the fact
that consumer goods embody stronger cultural contents. Third, we find that the effects are sig-
nificant even for the goods and services which are rarely advertised by the Korean firms overseas,
which further strengthens the preference-diffusion argument. These systematic differences in the
impact across products support the demand-driven hypothesis, because it is difficult to reconcile
these patterns with supply-side shifts or reverse causality.
By the estimate in Column 1 of Table 6, a one-percent increase in TV show exports increase the
exports of Korean consumer goods by 0.163%. During 2001–2014, the Korean TV show exports
have increased from US$ 18.92 million in 2001 to US$ 336.019 million in 2014. The export value of
Korean consumer goods was US$ 31.443 billion in 2002. Thus, the implied trade-creating impact
of TV show exports is around US$ 18.81 billion. In addition, the estimate in Table 2 indicates that
a one-percent increase in TV show exports leads to a 0.189% increase in the number of tourists.
In 2002, the number of tourists to Korea was 3,843,504, while the tourist expenditure per capita
was US$ 1,107. The growth of the Korean TV show exports during 2001–2014 thus implies an
increase in tourism revenues of US$ 3.07 billion. Together, the Korean wave has contributed to
South Korea’s economy by about 3.6% of its GDP in 2002 (or 1.6% of its GDP in 2015).26 This is
not including the profits generated by Korean firms from FDI overseas.
The results in this paper suggest an interesting policy implication: promoting a country’s culture
and its country image such that they affect foreign consumer preferences for its products/services
might just prove to be an effective export-promotion policy. This is especially relevant in a world
when technology has lowered communication cost in trade to unprecedentedly low levels and policy
barriers are overall liberalized by the multilateral trade negotiations via GATT/WTO. The demand-
side mechanism via preference diffusion, in comparison, leaves a large room for policy manipulation
and could play a complementary role to efforts on the supply-side to reduce market penetration
cost (Arkolakis, 2010).
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A Data Appendix
A.1 South Korea’s merchandize exports and outward FDI
Bilateral imports from South Korea at the HS 4-digit product level are downloaded from the UN
Comtrade Database for the period of 1991–2015. Outward FDI of South Korea to each destination
for the period of 1991–2015 is sourced from the Export-Import Bank of Korea, a Korean government
institution. See https://stats.koreaexim.go.kr/odisas.html.
A.2 Visitors to Korea
A.3 Gravity variables
Data on GDP (current US$), GDP per capita (current US$), and populations are downloaded from
the World Development Indicator of the World Bank. Distance between two countries is measured
by distw from CEPII; in particular, the measure calculates the weighted average distance between
the biggest cities of two countries, using population shares of the cities as weights. The information
on RTA is based on the RTA dataset maintained by Jose´ de Sousa, and supplemented by the CEPII
data on RTA.
Embassy (source, year available)
The size of overseas Koreans is retrieved from the “Report on the present state of overseas
Koreans,” published by South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This report is published every
two years (1997, 1999, . . . , 2015). We intrapolate the series linearly when the data for two adjacent
odd years are available; i.e., Koreant = (Koreant−1 + Koreant+1)/2. As indicated, this series is
available only from year 1997 onward.
Exchange rates are sourced from the Penn World Table, and supplemented by the World Bank
data when the whole exchange rate series for a country is missing from the Penn World Table. The
cross exchange rate (Korean won / national currency) is calculated from the Korean Won/USD
and the national currency/USD exchange rates.
A.4 Concordance of HS and BEC
The UN provides concordance between the HS 6-digit and the BEC codes. Given this concordance,
we classify each HS 6-digit as consumer goods or non-consumer goods (where the cluster of consumer
goods are as indicated in Table 1). We then further classify each HS 4-digit as consumer goods if all
of the HS 6-digit sub-industries under a HS 4-digit industry are consumer goods, as non-consumer
goods if all of the HS 6-digit sub-industries under a HS 4-digit industry are non-consumer goods,
and double-matching otherwise. About 10% of the HS 4-digit industries are in the category of
double-matching.
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Table 1: UN Broad Economic Categories
1 - Food and beverages
11 - Primary
111 - Mainly for industry
112 - Mainly for household consumption
12 - Processed
121 - Mainly for industry
122 - Mainly for household consumption
2 - Industrial supplies not elsewhere specified
21 - Primary
22 - Processed
3 - Fuels and lubricants
31 - Primary
32 - Processed
321 - Motor spirit
322 - Other
4 - Capital goods (except transport equipment), and parts and accessories thereof
41 - Capital goods (except transport equipment)
42 - Parts and accessories
5 - Transport equipment and parts and accessories thereof
51 - Passenger motor cars
52 - Other
521 - Industrial
522 - Non-industrial
53 - Parts and accessories
6 - Consumer goods not elsewhere specified
61 - Durable
62 - Semi-durable
63 - Non-durable
7 - Goods not elsewhere specified
99 - All categories
Note: Consumer goods are highlighted in boldface.
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Table 2: Female versus Male Tourists to South Korea
Percentage of Female visitors log Number of Tourists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnTV showExpc,t 1.989*** 0.134 0.0455 0.189*** 0.0101* 0.00672
(0.521) (0.122) (0.113) (0.0544) (0.00481) (0.00505)
Popularc 1.890*** 0.0712*
× lnTV showExpc,t (0.356) (0.0366)
lnPopulationc,t -5.313*** 14.40** 12.52* 0.383* 1.867*** 1.796***
(1.045) (6.165) (6.575) (0.195) (0.535) (0.537)
lnGDPperCapitac,t -4.997*** 8.021*** 6.546*** 0.608** 1.017*** 0.962***
(1.661) (0.963) (0.958) (0.244) (0.156) (0.142)
lnDistc -4.729*** -1.021***
(1.592) (0.158)
RTAc,t -1.092 2.210*** 2.217*** 0.176 0.241*** 0.241***
(1.943) (0.422) (0.440) (0.196) (0.0332) (0.0345)
Embassyc,t -5.060 -2.024** -1.569 -0.452 0.0205 0.0376
(4.796) (0.794) (0.900) (0.307) (0.0690) (0.0680)
lnKoreansc,t 1.795* -0.0757 0.122 0.102 -0.102** -0.0949**
(0.920) (0.664) (0.642) (0.130) (0.0407) (0.0426)
lnExRatec,t 2.252 2.721 -0.175 -0.158
(2.868) (2.905) (0.253) (0.249)
cons. 172.1*** -247.7** -214.4* 10.30** -22.61** -21.36**
(27.53) (99.13) (106.4) (3.784) (8.465) (8.576)
Obs. 403 391 391 403 391 391
R2 0.728 0.974 0.976 0.892 0.987 0.987
Year FE Y N N Y N N
Country FE N Y Y N Y Y
Notes: OLS estimation of equations (5) and (6). Each observation is an origin country (of the
tourists) and a year. Popularc = 1 if the country c’s K-wave popularity index is 4 (popular) or 5
(very popular). Standard errors are clustered by the origin country (for the year-FE regressions)
and by year (for the country-FE regressions). Sample is restricted to origin countries whose
GDP per capita in 2015 is more than US$ 4000. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Selected Industries by the UN Harmonized System (HS) of Classification
Panel A. Korean Wave Goods HS industries *** Panel B. Textiles and Textile Articles (UN HS Section XI)
HS code Description HS code Description
16 Meat, fish and seafood food preparations nes 50 Silk
17 Sugars and sugar confectionery 51 Wool, animal hair, horsehair yarn and fabric thereof
18 Cocoa and cocoa preparations 52 Cotton
19 Cereal, flour, starch, milk preparations and products 53 Vegetable textile fibres nes, paper yarn, woven fabric
20 Vegetable, fruit, nut, etc food preparations 54 manmade filaments
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations 55 manmade staple fibres
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 56 Wadding, felt, nonwovens, yarns, twine, cordage, etc
3304 Beauty, make-up and skin care preparations 57 Carpets and other textile floor coverings
3305 Hair preparations 58 Special woven or tufted fabric, lace, tapestry etc
3307 Shaving and toilet preparations nes, deodorizers 59 Impregnated, coated or laminated textile fabric
3402 Organic surface active agent, preparation, except soap 60 Knitted or crocheted fabric
4202 Trunks, suit-cases, camera cases, handbags, etc 61 Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet
4203 Clothing, accessories of leather, composition leather 62 Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet
61 Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 63 Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing etc
62 Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet
7113 Jewelry and parts, containing precious metal
7117 Imitation jewelry Panel C. Women’s and Men’s Clothing (HS61 & 62)
8415 Air conditioning equipment, machinery HS code Description
8418 Refrigerators, freezers and heat pumps nes 6102 Womens, girls overcoats, etc, knit or crochet
8450 Household, laundry-type washing machine, washer-drier 6104 Womens, girls suit, dress, skirt, etc, knit or crochet
8517 Electric apparatus for line telephony, telegraphy 6106 Womens, girls blouses & shirts, knit or crochet
8528 Television receivers, video monitors, projectors 6108 Womens, girls underwear, nightwear, etc knit, crochet
8703 Motor vehicles for transport of persons (except buses) 6202 Womens, girls overcoats, capes, windjackets etc, wove
6204 Womens, girls suits, jacket, dress, skirt, etc, wove
***The HS 4-digit industries that fall under the above clusters 6206 Womens or girls’ blouses, shirts and shirt-blouses
and that are also consumer goods. 6208 Womens, girls underwear, nightwear, not knit, crochet
6101 Mens, boys overcoats, capes, cloak, etc, knit, crochet
6103 Mens, boys suits, jackets, trousers etc knit or crochet
6105 Mens, boys shirts, knit or crochet
6107 Mens, boys underwear, nightwear, etc, knit or crochet
6201 Mens, boys overcoats, capes, windjackets etc, woven
6203 Mens or boys suits, jackets, trousers etc not knit
6205 Men’s or boys’ shirts
Notes: (i) Panel A: Korean Wave Goods indicate the subset of consumer goods whose sales overseas are documented by surveys and reports
to have increased largely due to the Korean wave. (ii) Panel B: the HS industries included in Section XI (textiles and textile articles). (iii)
Panel C: the HS industries that correspond to women’s and men’s clothing.
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Table 4: Korea’s Beauty Product Exports
(1) (2) (3)
lnTV showExpc,t 0.396*** 0.251*** 0.0496*
(0.0820) (0.0593) (0.0284)
Popularc 0.318***
× lnTV showExpc,t (0.0756)
lnGDPc,t 0.212** 1.621*** 1.458***
(0.0837) (0.240) (0.162)
lnDistc -0.117
(0.152)
RTAc,t -0.457 0.427*** 0.515***
(0.387) (0.0937) (0.136)
Embassyc,t 0.309 0.156 0.484
(0.657) (0.386) (0.366)
lnKoreansc,t -0.0525 -0.0426 -0.110
(0.109) (0.225) (0.228)
lnExRatec,t -0.0348 0.0901
(0.421) (0.344)
cons. 3.020* -23.87*** -23.08***
(1.744) (4.265) (3.447)
Obs. 1297 1276 1276
R2 0.675 0.862 0.886
Year FE Y N N
Country FE N Y Y
Notes: PPML estimation of equations (5) and (6). Each
observation is an export destination and a year. Beauty
products include cosmetics, skin-care, and hair products.
Popularc = 1 if the country c’s K-wave popularity index
is 4 (popular) or 5 (very popular). Standard errors are clus-
tered by export destination (Column 1) or by year (Columns
2 & 3). Missing trade values are not replaced by zeros. The
symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Women’s versus Men’s Clothing Exports of South Korea
Dependent variables: decadal changes in exports by HS 4-digit industries under textiles and textile articles (in log)
Panel A. For period of exposure Panel B. Falsification Tests for period of pre-exposure
2002-2015 stacked (2002-2007, 2007-2015) 1991-2001 stacked (1991-1996, 1996-2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
WomensClothingi 0.345** 0.307** 0.226*** 0.271*** 0.249*** 0.204*** -0.00227 0.00473 0.00631 -0.0455 -0.0203 -0.0407
×∆ lnTV showExpc (0.137) (0.137) (0.0562) (0.0740) (0.0750) (0.0488) (0.156) (0.167) (0.104) (0.0738) (0.0713) (0.0502)
MensClothingi 0.272*** 0.241*** 0.188*** 0.132* 0.114 0.145*** -0.186 -0.188 -0.186 0.0286 0.0330 0.00550
×∆ lnTV showExpc (0.0895) (0.0900) (0.0534) (0.0759) (0.0745) (0.0544) (0.214) (0.225) (0.127) (0.0554) (0.0533) (0.0431)
∆ lnTV showExpc 0.0497 -0.0280* 0.0294 -0.0201* -0.00658 0.0203 0.0715** 0.00489
(0.0486) (0.0150) (0.0354) (0.0103) (0.0618) (0.0304) (0.0282) (0.0120)
∆GoodsExpc 0.968*** 1.000*** 0.923*** 0.963***
(0.0247) (0.0132) (0.0582) (0.0220)
∆ lnGDPc 0.754*** 0.0183 1.128*** 0.00217 0.736* -0.125 1.094*** 0.0220
(0.156) (0.0213) (0.231) (0.0397) (0.384) (0.125) (0.242) (0.106)
∆ lnExRatec -0.469*** 0.0232 0.268 0.0666* -0.110** 0.0306 -0.355*** -0.00196
(0.161) (0.0301) (0.198) (0.0357) (0.0525) (0.0185) (0.0880) (0.0241)
∆ lnKoreansc 0.234** -0.0218 0.131 -0.0370*** 0.0686 0.0200 0.0511 -0.0250
(0.103) (0.0174) (0.0801) (0.0106) (0.112) (0.0306) (0.0975) (0.0318)
cons. -2.232*** -1.337*** -0.263 -0.632 0.560 1.117 -2.887*** -3.122*** -3.587*** -2.223*** -2.071*** -1.907***
(0.190) (0.0580) (0.272) (0.634) (0.491) (0.866) (0.244) (0.0856) (0.368) (0.396) (0.390) (0.363)
Obs. 2768 2768 3877 7196 7196 8418 1501 1501 1502 4505 4505 4538
R2 0.184 0.249 0.253 0.123 0.196 0.125 0.204 0.235 0.238 0.154 0.202 0.183
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × Period FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: OLS estimation of equations (7)–(9) using the Women’s and Men’s clothing dummies. Observations include all HS 4-digit industries under Section XI (textiles and textile
articles). Each observation is a destination country and a HS 4-digit industry (and a period for the two-period stacked regressions). Falsification tests explore the relationship
between the future changes in Korea’s TV show exports and the past changes in merchandise exports. Standard errors are clustered by export destination in specifications
(7)–(8) and robust in specification (9). The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The two control variables, ∆RTAc
and ∆Embassyc, are dropped, because the RTA and Embassy status of Korea with most trading partners have not changed during this period.
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Table 6: Korea’s Exports: Consumer Goods versus Intermediate/Capital Goods
Dependent variables: decadal changes in exports by HS 4-digit industries (in log)
Panel A. For period of exposure Panel B. Falsification Tests for period of pre-exposure
2002-2015 stacked (2002-2007, 2007-2015) 1991-2001 stacked (1991-1996, 1996-2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ConsumerGoodsi 0.163*** 0.155*** 0.110*** 0.0807*** 0.0764** 0.0679*** 0.0332 0.0258 0.0232 0.00608 0.00917 0.00104
×∆ lnTV showExpc (0.0379) (0.0391) (0.0145) (0.0286) (0.0302) (0.0126) (0.0496) (0.0636) (0.0326) (0.0226) (0.0224) (0.0139)
∆ lnTV showExpc -0.000557 -0.0320*** -0.0198 -0.0179** -0.0317 -0.0109 0.0400 0.00328
(0.0314) (0.00945) (0.0266) (0.00815) (0.0457) (0.0157) (0.0268) (0.00917)
∆GoodsExpc 1.008*** 1.003*** 0.863*** 0.996***
(0.0257) (0.0184) (0.0479) (0.0350)
∆ lnGDPc 0.753*** 0.0285 1.051*** -0.0107 0.575 -0.108 0.986*** 0.0404
(0.159) (0.0238) (0.183) (0.0277) (0.339) (0.115) (0.175) (0.0974)
∆ lnExRatec -0.456*** 0.0465 0.0740 0.0261 0.0201 0.0237* -0.0226 0.0138
(0.167) (0.0465) (0.136) (0.0251) (0.0582) (0.0135) (0.0682) (0.0193)
∆ lnKoreansc 0.229** -0.0325 0.181** -0.0130 -0.0257 -0.0606* -0.0161 -0.0619*
(0.108) (0.0238) (0.0760) (0.0127) (0.114) (0.0322) (0.0739) (0.0336)
cons. 3.855*** 3.667*** 4.763*** -0.711 -0.667 0.204 1.171*** 0.945*** 1.212*** -0.100 -0.0683* -1.358***
(0.0967) (0.0195) (0.393) (0.936) (0.863) (0.882) (0.218) (0.107) (0.152) (0.0961) (0.0377) (0.302)
Obs. 17179 17179 23172 44874 44874 52150 8356 8356 8363 25334 25334 25510
R2 0.243 0.271 0.276 0.152 0.181 0.150 0.296 0.313 0.315 0.177 0.198 0.190
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × Period FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: OLS estimation of equations (7)–(9). Observations include all HS 4-digit industries. Each observation is a destination country and a HS 4-digit industry (and a period
for the two-period stacked regressions). Falsification tests explore the relationship between the future changes in Korea’s TV show exports and the past changes in merchandise
exports. Standard errors are clustered by export destination in specifications (7)–(8) and robust in specification (9). The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The two control variables, ∆RTAc and ∆Embassyc, are dropped, because the RTA and Embassy status of Korea with most trading
partners have not changed during this period.
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Table 7: Korea’s Exports in Korean Wave Goods
Beauty Products Jewelry Clothes & Bags
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
hs3304 hs3305 hs3307 hs3402 hs7113 hs7117 hs61 hs62 hs4202 hs4203
lnTV showExpc,t 0.580*** 0.368*** 0.472*** 0.0388 0.718*** 0.294*** 0.142** 0.283** 0.231 0.226***
(0.0703) (0.0726) (0.0720) (0.0416) (0.190) (0.0647) (0.0630) (0.120) (0.147) (0.0744)
lnGDPc,t 0.235** 0.0384 0.458*** 0.157** 0.464** 0.900*** 1.316*** 0.435** 0.690*** 1.070***
(0.117) (0.131) (0.117) (0.0785) (0.183) (0.0862) (0.178) (0.215) (0.159) (0.193)
lnDistc 0.256 0.355*** -0.477*** -0.833*** 0.472 0.164** 0.0115 0.600*** 0.0252 -0.306***
(0.186) (0.117) (0.138) (0.133) (0.296) (0.0693) (0.109) (0.158) (0.250) (0.0903)
RTAc,t -0.740* -0.507 -0.294 0.217 -0.0773 -0.400 0.0327 -1.082** 0.280 -0.00313
(0.419) (0.330) (0.247) (0.206) (0.334) (0.496) (0.246) (0.538) (0.584) (0.472)
Embassyc,t 0.400 -1.089** 1.037*** 0.444 3.499** 1.109*** 0.281 -0.0376 0.773 1.597*
(0.729) (0.480) (0.316) (0.353) (1.518) (0.340) (0.352) (0.544) (0.848) (0.870)
lnKoreansc,t -0.156 0.258** -0.322*** 0.192*** -0.442* -0.191*** -0.152 0.122 -0.0594 -0.129
(0.109) (0.106) (0.112) (0.0665) (0.267) (0.0620) (0.103) (0.0763) (0.133) (0.133)
cons. -2.363 -0.474 -1.658 9.999*** -9.980** -12.57*** -16.63*** -4.823 -6.422** -13.14***
(2.071) (2.544) (2.219) (1.433) (4.059) (1.589) (3.151) (2.974) (2.611) (3.788)
Obs. 1120 920 925 1092 709 1121 1392 1400 1336 1077
R2 0.596 0.746 0.861 0.880 0.344 0.841 0.961 0.942 0.761 0.958
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: PPML estimation of equation (5). Standard errors are clustered by the export destination. Missing trade values are not replaced by
zeros. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7 (continued): Korea’s Exports in Korean Wave Goods
Food Refrigerator
Washing
Machine
Telephone Aircon TV Car
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
hs16–22 hs8418 hs8450 hs8517 hs8415 hs8528 hs8703
lnTV showExpc,t 0.303*** 0.0786** 0.188*** 0.0560 0.0232 -0.00446 0.00463
(0.100) (0.0309) (0.0503) (0.0742) (0.0465) (0.0761) (0.0436)
lnGDPc,t 0.475*** 0.575*** 0.499*** 0.578*** 0.548*** 0.899*** 0.632***
(0.154) (0.0683) (0.104) (0.185) (0.109) (0.207) (0.0800)
lnDistc -0.110 0.786*** 0.873*** -0.00178 0.353** 0.306 1.070***
(0.247) (0.0840) (0.0921) (0.152) (0.177) (0.223) (0.252)
RTAc,t -0.337 0.104 -0.269 0.0531 0.0873 -0.149 -0.241
(0.318) (0.151) (0.241) (0.308) (0.216) (0.166) (0.182)
Embassyc,t 0.368 -0.300 -1.672*** 0.188 0.468 0.270 -0.306
(0.558) (0.320) (0.389) (0.435) (0.330) (0.339) (0.441)
lnKoreansc,t 0.00769 0.159*** 0.142* 0.206** 0.0878 -0.0771 0.190***
(0.159) (0.0406) (0.0790) (0.101) (0.0664) (0.124) (0.0548)
cons. -0.566 -9.697*** -9.154*** -3.307 -5.171*** -10.96*** -10.43***
(3.305) (1.159) (2.141) (2.922) (1.902) (3.873) (2.115)
Obs. 1360 1483 1336 1398 1458 1460 1564
R2 0.786 0.879 0.830 0.857 0.750 0.478 0.928
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: PPML estimation of equation (5). Standard errors are clustered by the export destination. Missing trade values
are not replaced by zeros. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 8: Korea’s Exports: Korean Wave Goods versus the rest
Dependent variables: decadal changes in exports by HS 4-digit industries (in log)
2002-2015 stacked (2002-2007, 2007-2015) 2002-2007 2007-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
KoreanWaveGoodsi 0.263*** 0.253*** 0.182*** 0.145*** 0.140*** 0.108*** 0.139** 0.131** 0.133*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.0871***
×∆ lnTV showExpc (0.0596) (0.0622) (0.0207) (0.0378) (0.0398) (0.0191) (0.0552) (0.0572) (0.0312) (0.0504) (0.0523) (0.0246)
∆ lnTV showExpc 0.0126 -0.0198*** -0.0145 -0.0132** -0.0499 -0.0153** 0.0257 -0.0118
(0.0288) (0.00612) (0.0249) (0.00522) (0.0387) (0.00595) (0.0259) (0.00840)
∆GoodsExpTrendc 1.009*** 1.003*** 1.005*** 0.989***
(0.0253) (0.0184) (0.0269) (0.0217)
∆ lnGDPc 0.755*** 0.0296 1.052*** -0.0105 0.902*** -0.0657 1.035*** 0.0278
(0.159) (0.0234) (0.183) (0.0277) (0.306) (0.0464) (0.233) (0.0335)
∆ lnExRatec -0.460*** 0.0431 0.0727 0.0249 0.484* 0.123** -0.121 -0.0179
(0.166) (0.0465) (0.136) (0.0251) (0.260) (0.0568) (0.145) (0.0207)
∆ lnKoreansc 0.230** -0.0313 0.181** -0.0131 0.192* -0.00831 0.234** -0.0127
(0.108) (0.0229) (0.0758) (0.0125) (0.0997) (0.0156) (0.104) (0.0157)
cons. 3.837*** 3.650*** 4.736*** -0.724 -0.679 0.197 -0.500 -0.633 0.321 -1.721* -1.593* -0.903
(0.0961) (0.0180) (0.395) (0.941) (0.866) (0.883) (0.951) (0.863) (0.926) (0.975) (0.949) (0.954)
Obs. 17179 17179 23172 44874 44874 52150 23670 23670 23941 21204 21204 28209
R2 0.244 0.272 0.276 0.152 0.181 0.150 0.166 0.195 0.197 0.140 0.166 0.160
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × Period FE Y Y Y
Country FE N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: OLS estimation of equations (7)–(9) using the Korean Wave Goods dummy. Observations include all HS 4-digit industries. Each observation is a destination country
and a HS 4-digit industry (and a period for the two-period stacked regressions). Standard errors are clustered by export destination in specifications (7)–(8) and robust in
specification (9). The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The two control variables, ∆RTAc and ∆Embassyc,
are dropped, because the RTA and Embassy status of Korea with most trading partners have not changed during this period.
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Table 9: Falsification Tests of Table 8 (Korean Wave Goods versus the rest)
Dependent variables: decadal changes in exports by HS 4-digit industries (in log)
1991-2001 stacked (1991-1996, 1996-2001) 1991-1996 1996-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
KoreanWaveGoodsi 0.00870 -0.00162 -0.00836 0.000614 0.00673 -0.00516 -0.131 -0.110 -0.120** 0.0326 0.0193 0.0263
×∆ lnTV showExpc (0.0606) (0.0818) (0.0502) (0.0380) (0.0359) (0.0199) (0.111) (0.108) (0.0526) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0216)
∆ lnTV showExpc -0.0245 -0.00437 0.0415 0.00491 0.0547 0.00890 0.0162 0.00664
(0.0421) (0.0103) (0.0258) (0.00724) (0.0353) (0.0152) (0.0294) (0.00898)
∆GoodsExpTrendc 0.864*** 0.996*** 0.893*** 1.025***
(0.0486) (0.0350) (0.0665) (0.0387)
∆ lnGDPc 0.581* -0.103 0.987*** 0.0415 1.263*** 0.100 0.765*** 0.0491
(0.340) (0.117) (0.175) (0.0970) (0.269) (0.132) (0.208) (0.120)
∆ lnExRatec 0.0194 0.0231 -0.0226 0.0137 -0.157** 0.0120 0.102 -0.00615
(0.0582) (0.0137) (0.0681) (0.0193) (0.0648) (0.0262) (0.0990) (0.0293)
∆ lnKoreansc -0.0267 -0.0616* -0.0163 -0.0622* 0.0789 -0.0487* -0.188* -0.0451
(0.114) (0.0319) (0.0739) (0.0336) (0.0664) (0.0244) (0.103) (0.0703)
cons. 1.155*** 0.930*** 1.214*** -0.104 -0.0724** -1.359*** -0.181 -0.0646 0.355*** 0.214 0.106 -1.487
(0.208) (0.0980) (0.151) (0.0936) (0.0340) (0.302) (0.173) (0.0582) (0.0926) (1.321) (1.347) (1.358)
Obs. 8356 8356 8363 25334 25334 25510 7739 7739 7746 17595 17595 17764
R2 0.296 0.313 0.315 0.177 0.198 0.190 0.251 0.258 0.260 0.141 0.165 0.166
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × Period FE Y Y Y
Country FE N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: Falsification tests explore the relationship between the future changes in Korea’s TV show exports and the past changes in merchandise exports. OLS estimation
of equations (7)–(9) using the Korean Wave Goods dummy and the future changes in Korea’s TV show exports. Observations include all HS 4-digit industries. Each
observation is a destination country and a HS 4-digit industry (and a period for the two-period stacked regressions). Standard errors are clustered by export destination
in specifications (7)–(8) and robust in specification (9). The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The
two control variables, ∆RTAc and ∆Embassyc, are dropped, because the RTA and Embassy status of Korea with most trading partners have not changed during this
period.
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Table 10: Korea’s FDI Sectors
KoreanWaveService Sectors
Restaurant Restaurants and accommodation business
Retail & Wholesale Grocery stores, retail/wholesale business
Entertainment & Leisure Concerts, performances, arts, leisure services
Broadcasting Broadcasting, publishing, communication and information services
Medical Medical clinics
Education service Educational services
Personal service Personal services such as hair salons
Non-KoreanWaveService Sectors
Agriculture Agriculture, forestry, fisheries
Business management Business facilities management, business support services
Construction Construction
Finance Finance, insurance
International Institutions International, foreign institutions
Manufacturing Manufacturing industries
Mining Mining industries
Public Administration Public, defense, social security administration
Science and Technology Services associated with science and technology
Shipping Shipping, transportation
Leasing & Real Estate Leasing, real estate business
Electricity & Gas Electricity, gas, water supply
Waste management Waste treatment, environmental restoration
Notes: Data are from The Export-Import Bank of Korea, which belongs to the Korean govern-
ment. See https://stats.koreaexim.go.kr/odisas.html.
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Table 11: Korea’s outward FDI in KoreanWaveService sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Restaurant
Retail &
Wholesale
Entertain.
& Leisure
Broadcast. Medical
Education
service
Personal
service
lnTV showExpc,t 0.232** 0.414*** 0.659*** 0.682*** 0.413 0.326* 0.298*
(0.107) (0.142) (0.124) (0.107) (0.257) (0.171) (0.165)
lnGDPc,t -0.0792 0.433*** -0.138 0.314*** -0.0552 0.0510 0.336***
(0.168) (0.132) (0.133) (0.106) (0.160) (0.199) (0.128)
lnDistc 0.590*** 0.581** 0.186 0.797*** 1.189*** 0.781** 0.757***
(0.165) (0.233) (0.230) (0.169) (0.317) (0.306) (0.222)
RTAc,t 1.285*** 0.0753 -0.584 0.253 0.0831 0.248 0.422
(0.244) (0.323) (0.539) (0.269) (0.735) (0.583) (0.468)
Embassyc,t 2.830*** 1.689 3.912*** 1.406*** 1.936 -0.485 1.091
(0.605) (1.311) (0.872) (0.448) (2.011) (0.595) (1.183)
lnKoreansc,t 0.583*** -0.0651 0.194 -0.0371 0.448 0.452*** 0.431**
(0.124) (0.140) (0.139) (0.0952) (0.278) (0.121) (0.195)
cons. -2.348 -6.655*** 0.453 -10.67*** -11.65* -6.553** -12.58***
(1.974) (2.144) (2.641) (2.192) (6.135) (2.633) (2.556)
Obs. 1082 1082 1082 1082 1082 1082 1082
R2 0.824 0.668 0.663 0.794 0.803 0.787 0.893
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: PPML estimation of equation (5). Missing FDI values are replaced by zeros. Standard errors are clustered by
FDI destination. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 12: (continued) Korea’s outward FDI in non-KoreanWaveService sectors
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
Agriculture
Business
manage-
ment
Construction Finance Manufact. Mining sciTech
Leasing
& Real
Estate
Public
admin.
Shipping
Electricity
& Gas
Waste
Manage-
ment
lnTV showExpc,t 0.0141 0.0694 -0.0443 0.263 -0.0405 0.139 0.122 0.121 -0.451 0.422*** 0.173* 0.656***
(0.0905) (0.112) (0.0890) (0.222) (0.117) (0.138) (0.159) (0.153) (0.356) (0.154) (0.105) (0.249)
lnGDPc,t -0.166 0.380* -0.112 0.250* 0.132 0.0429 0.604*** 0.151 -0.367 0.261** 0.146 -0.173
(0.140) (0.197) (0.153) (0.137) (0.147) (0.159) (0.200) (0.133) (0.257) (0.132) (0.132) (0.237)
lnDistc 0.0643 -0.0484 -0.158 0.441 -0.579** 1.270*** 0.288 0.579*** -1.764*** 0.635* -0.0960 0.345
(0.308) (0.271) (0.248) (0.357) (0.260) (0.283) (0.407) (0.194) (0.321) (0.335) (0.438) (0.436)
RTAc,t 1.023 1.385*** 1.150*** 0.374 0.799*** -0.0857 1.072 0.636 3.867** 0.972 -0.345 1.262
(0.773) (0.373) (0.328) (0.722) (0.291) (0.567) (0.891) (0.538) (1.550) (0.645) (0.442) (0.800)
Embassyc,t 3.257*** 1.265 -0.322 0.0818 0.388 -1.047 -0.112 -1.580 1.713 -0.178
(1.037) (0.940) (0.788) (1.888) (0.858) (0.866) (1.508) (1.437) (1.382) (1.143)
lnKoreansc,t 0.410*** 0.0779 0.441*** 0.122 0.453** 0.326** -0.0607 0.375** 1.662*** -0.0390 0.0528 0.0669
(0.138) (0.137) (0.133) (0.262) (0.192) (0.157) (0.182) (0.177) (0.502) (0.169) (0.155) (0.322)
cons. 3.656 -3.134 9.840*** -3.740 10.86*** -4.371 -8.377** -0.615 20.91*** -7.309** -1.526 0.236
(3.687) (3.212) (2.857) (4.771) (2.264) (2.868) (3.856) (3.430) (4.162) (3.312) (4.564) (4.239)
Obs. 1082 1082 1082 1082 1082 1082 1082 1082 433 1082 970 760
R2 0.070 0.073 0.183 0.496 0.600 0.417 0.296 0.516 0.983 0.418 0.223 0.162
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: PPML estimation of equation (5). Missing FDI values are replaced by zeros. Standard errors are clustered by FDI destination. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sector ‘International’ is dropped because there are insufficient observations.
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Table 13: Korea’s outward FDI: KoreanWaveService sectors versus the rest
FDI 2002-2015 Falsification Tests: FDI 1991-2001
(1) (2) (3) (4)
KoreanWaveServicei 0.123*** 0.126*** KoreanWaveServicei 0.00160 0.00173
× lnTV showExpc,t (0.0164) (0.0164) × lnTV showExpc,t+12 (0.0405) (0.0418)
lnTV showExpc,t 0.0208 0.0232 lnTV showExpc,t+12 -0.0597 -0.0673
(0.0340) (0.0366) (0.146) (0.165)
lnGDPc,t -0.672*** -0.525*** lnGDPc,t -0.0708 -0.0562
(0.151) (0.139) (0.405) (0.424)
lnExRatec,t 0.558* 0.180 lnExRatec,t 0.153 0.136
(0.315) (0.363) (0.113) (0.109)
RTAc,t 0.00116 0.0668 RTAc,t
(0.0920) (0.0842)
Embassyc,t -2.503*** Embassyc,t+12 -2.627***
(0.519) (0.539)
lnKoreansc,t 0.622*** lnKoreansc,t+12 0.526
(0.134) (0.364)
cons. 3.020* -23.87*** cons. 6.501 6.890
(1.744) (4.265) (7.714) (10.30)
Obs. 1297 1276 Obs. 9531 9531
R2 0.675 0.862 R2 0.661 0.653
Sector×Year FE Y Y Sector×Year FE Y Y
Country FE Y Y Country FE Y Y
Notes: PPML estimation, with country and sector-year fixed effects. Observations include all FDI sectors. Each
observation is a sector-country-year. Standard errors are clustered by year. The indicatorKoreanWaveServicei
equals one if sector i is one of the Korean wave service sectors listed in Table 10. The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Falsification tests explore the
relationship between the future changes in Korea’s TV show exports and the past changes in FDI. The data for
the two control variables, Embassyc,t and lnKoreansc,t, are available only since 1995 and 1997, respectively.
Thus, we use their future values in the falsification tests. The alternative results are provided as robustness
checks if we simply drop them from the regression.
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Table A.1: Korea’s Exports: Consumer Goods versus Intermediate/Capital Goods
(Double-matching HS 4-digit industries classified as consumer goods)
Dependent variables: decadal changes in exports by HS 4-digit industries (in log)
Panel A. For period of exposure Panel B. Falsification Tests for period of pre-exposure
2002-2015 stacked (2002-2007, 2007-2015) 1991-2001 stacked (1991-1996, 1996-2001)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
ConsumerGoodsi 0.105*** 0.0981*** 0.0687*** 0.0527** 0.0472** 0.0495*** 0.0334 0.0309 0.0280 0.00959 0.0105 -0.00106
×∆ lnTV showExpc (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0112) (0.0209) (0.0217) (0.00960) (0.0289) (0.0371) (0.0249) (0.0197) (0.0194) (0.0102)
∆ lnTV showExpc -0.000534 -0.0316*** -0.0211 -0.0187** -0.0289 -0.00649 0.0392 0.00260
(0.0315) (0.00945) (0.0265) (0.00816) (0.0466) (0.0153) (0.0266) (0.00937)
∆GoodsExpc 1.005*** 1.021*** 0.896*** 0.976***
(0.0218) (0.0117) (0.0509) (0.0247)
∆ lnGDPc 0.754*** 0.0183 1.076*** -0.0171 0.619* -0.115 0.954*** 0.00712
(0.156) (0.0213) (0.182) (0.0222) (0.350) (0.0930) (0.169) (0.0896)
∆ lnExRatec -0.469*** 0.0232 0.0938 0.0483** 0.0110 0.0207* -0.0317 0.0119
(0.161) (0.0301) (0.136) (0.0192) (0.0568) (0.0111) (0.0626) (0.0154)
∆ lnKoreansc 0.234** -0.0218 0.180** -0.0180** 0.00244 -0.0250 -0.00283 -0.0384*
(0.103) (0.0174) (0.0744) (0.00896) (0.111) (0.0206) (0.0661) (0.0211)
cons. 3.853*** 3.671*** 4.586*** -0.717 -0.666 0.159 1.139*** 0.907*** 1.215*** -0.0855 -0.0489 -0.256
(0.0966) (0.0171) (0.307) (0.936) (0.861) (0.880) (0.230) (0.105) (0.136) (0.0948) (0.0370) (0.823)
Obs. 20233 20233 27404 52924 52924 61618 9900 9900 9915 30287 30287 30519
R2 0.244 0.273 0.278 0.151 0.183 0.150 0.299 0.318 0.319 0.175 0.197 0.188
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × Period FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Country FE N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: OLS estimation of equations (7)–(9). Observations include all HS 4-digit industries. Each observation is a destination country and a HS 4-digit industry (and a period
for the two-period stacked regressions). Falsification tests explore the relationship between the future changes in Korea’s TV show exports and the past changes in merchandise
exports. Standard errors are clustered by export destination in specifications (7)–(8) and robust in specification (9). The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The two control variables, ∆RTAc and ∆Embassyc, are dropped, because the RTA and Embassy status of Korea with most trading
partners have not changed during this period.
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Table A.2: Korea’s Exports: Korean Wave Goods versus the rest
(Double-matching HS 4-digit industries classified as consumer goods)
Dependent variables: decadal changes in exports by HS 4-digit industries (in log)
2002-2015 stacked (2002-2007, 2007-2015) 2002-2007 2007-2015
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
KoreanWaveGoodsi 0.188*** 0.179*** 0.129*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.0839*** 0.0921** 0.0854** 0.0864*** 0.111** 0.116** 0.0723***
×∆ lnTV showExpc (0.0458) (0.0479) (0.0179) (0.0276) (0.0292) (0.0166) (0.0356) (0.0370) (0.0270) (0.0422) (0.0441) (0.0213)
∆ lnTV showExpc 0.0167 -0.0159** -0.0138 -0.0130*** -0.0504 -0.0163*** 0.0274 -0.00976
(0.0284) (0.00599) (0.0243) (0.00415) (0.0384) (0.00430) (0.0250) (0.00679)
∆GoodsExpTrendc 1.005*** 1.022*** 1.017*** 1.015***
(0.0218) (0.0117) (0.0167) (0.0147)
∆ lnGDPc 0.757*** 0.0207 1.077*** -0.0177 0.952*** -0.0387 1.040*** -0.0143
(0.157) (0.0209) (0.182) (0.0222) (0.305) (0.0316) (0.230) (0.0298)
∆ lnExRatec -0.466*** 0.0267 0.0943 0.0488** 0.478* 0.128*** -0.0952 0.00937
(0.161) (0.0307) (0.136) (0.0190) (0.265) (0.0386) (0.143) (0.0186)
∆ lnKoreansc 0.235** -0.0205 0.180** -0.0177** 0.196** -0.00780 0.223** -0.0300**
(0.103) (0.0168) (0.0743) (0.00892) (0.0955) (0.01000) (0.107) (0.0122)
cons. 3.830*** 3.649*** 4.544*** -0.735 -0.680 0.147 -0.527 -0.651 0.617 -1.729* -1.588* -0.971
(0.0966) (0.0154) (0.309) (0.941) (0.864) (0.881) (0.953) (0.864) (0.891) (0.976) (0.948) (0.949)
Obs. 20233 20233 27404 52924 52924 61618 27994 27994 28323 24930 24930 33295
R2 0.244 0.274 0.279 0.152 0.183 0.150 0.166 0.197 0.198 0.139 0.168 0.162
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × Period FE Y Y Y
Country FE N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: OLS estimation of equations (7)–(9) using the Korean Wave Goods dummy. Observations include all HS 4-digit industries. Each observation is a destination country and
a HS 4-digit industry (and a period for the two-period stacked regressions). Standard errors are clustered by export destination in specifications (7)–(8) and robust in specification
(9). The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The two control variables, ∆RTAc and ∆Embassyc, are dropped,
because the RTA and Embassy status of Korea with most trading partners have not changed during this period.
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Table A.3: Falsification Tests of Table A.2 (Korean Wave Goods versus the rest)
(Double-matching HS 4-digit industries classified as consumer goods)
Dependent variables: decadal changes in exports by HS 4-digit industries (in log)
1991-2001 stacked (1991-1996, 1996-2001) 1991-1996 1996-2001
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
KoreanWaveGoodsi -0.00500 -0.0132 -0.0153 0.0101 0.0126 -0.00348 -0.0676 -0.0501 -0.0519 0.0334 0.0204 0.0156
×∆ lnTV showExpc (0.0510) (0.0686) (0.0428) (0.0302) (0.0280) (0.0173) (0.0657) (0.0655) (0.0458) (0.0290) (0.0283) (0.0188)
∆ lnTV showExpc -0.0154 0.00693 0.0420* 0.00546 0.0510 0.00594 0.0180 0.00645
(0.0419) (0.00875) (0.0244) (0.00531) (0.0386) (0.00947) (0.0266) (0.00607)
∆GoodsExpTrendc 0.897*** 0.976*** 0.892*** 0.994***
(0.0507) (0.0247) (0.0503) (0.0278)
∆ lnGDPc 0.628* -0.107 0.955*** 0.00814 1.214*** 0.0307 0.748*** 0.0302
(0.349) (0.0936) (0.169) (0.0886) (0.268) (0.0833) (0.198) (0.108)
∆ lnExRatec 0.0104 0.0200* -0.0319 0.0116 -0.165** 0.00732 0.0885 -0.00634
(0.0565) (0.0112) (0.0625) (0.0154) (0.0689) (0.0199) (0.0938) (0.0231)
∆ lnKoreansc 0.00210 -0.0254 -0.00280 -0.0384* 0.112* -0.0123 -0.189** -0.0441
(0.111) (0.0202) (0.0661) (0.0211) (0.0652) (0.0167) (0.0903) (0.0419)
cons. 1.108*** 0.877*** 1.218*** -0.0924 -0.0560* -0.256 -0.155 -0.0346 0.294*** 0.214 0.112 -0.396
(0.216) (0.0936) (0.133) (0.0902) (0.0300) (0.824) (0.182) (0.0375) (0.0845) (1.324) (1.350) (1.555)
Obs. 9900 9900 9915 30287 30287 30519 9167 9167 9182 21120 21120 21337
R2 0.299 0.318 0.319 0.175 0.197 0.188 0.247 0.254 0.256 0.141 0.166 0.165
Industry FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry × Period FE Y Y Y
Country FE N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: Falsification tests explore the relationship between the future changes in Korea’s TV show exports and the past changes in merchandise exports. OLS estimation
of equations (7)–(9) using the Korean Wave Goods dummy and the future changes in Korea’s TV show exports. Observations include all HS 4-digit industries. Each
observation is a destination country and a HS 4-digit industry (and a period for the two-period stacked regressions). Standard errors are clustered by export destination
in specifications (7)–(8) and robust in specification (9). The symbols ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The two
control variables, ∆RTAc and ∆Embassyc, are dropped, because the RTA and Embassy status of Korea with most trading partners have not changed during this period.
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Figure 1: TV Program Exports of South Korea
Figure 2: Genre Composition of TV Show Exports and Imports of South Korea
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Figure 3: Korea’s TV Program Exports across Selected Destinations (in 2001, 2004, and 2014)
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Figure 4: Music Exports and Imports of South Korea
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Figure 5: Popularity Index World Map (e.g., Level 5: very popular; Level 1: not interested)
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Survey Results (N = 6500), by KOFICE 2015
Question: After experiencing Korean pop culture (TV dramas, K-pop, Movies), how have your 
preferences for the following Korean Products and Services changed?
Figure 6: Survey Results published by KOFICE (2015b)
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Figure 7: Korea’s Export Trends in Selected BEC Categories
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Figure 8: Growth in the Number of Foreign Tourists to South Korea
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Figure 9: Growth of Beauty Product Exports from South Korea to Selected Destinations
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